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Abstract
We analyze the last major imposition of mandatory disclosure in US equity markets. The
1964 Securities Act Amendments required a group of ﬁrms traded over the counter (OTC)
to periodically provide audited ﬁnancial information, proxy information prior to shareholder
meetings, and details on insider holdings and trades to their shareholders for the ﬁrst time.
This legislation left unchanged the disclosure requirements of all NYSE, all AMEX, and some
OTC ﬁrms. When we use these unaﬀected groups as a counterfactual for the aﬀected ﬁrms, we
ﬁnd that those ﬁrms that were newly required to make all types of disclosures required by the
1964 Act had a cumulative abnormal excess return of approximately 20% in the approximately
year and a half between the initial calls for legislative action and the law’s passage. In that same
time period, ﬁrms for which proxy and insider information were the only new mandated forms
of disclosure had a (marginally statistically signiﬁcant) cumulative abnormal excess return of
about 10%. In contrast, there is little evidence of a diﬀerence between the adjusted returns of
aﬀected and unaﬀected groups in a period when there is no new information about the law or
which ﬁrms will comply with its requirements. Finally, event study analyses indicate that ﬁrms
that initially register with the SEC after the 1964 Amendments experienced positive abnormal
excess returns and modest reductions in bid/ask spreads.
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Since the New Deal the federal government has actively regulated US equity markets and the
centerpiece of these eﬀorts has been the mandated disclosure of ﬁrm ﬁnancial information. These
interventions into the marketplace are controversial.1 On the one hand, it is argued that such
regulation is at best unnecessary, and at worst damaging. This argument is based on the notion
that explicit contracts between involved parties and private litigation (and the threat of such)
is a cost eﬀective way to prevent misbehavior by insiders. Furthermore, reputation concerns of
managers, underwriters and auditors reduce or eliminate the incentives for them to expropriate
outside investors. In this case, mandated disclosure cannot have a positive eﬀect on ﬁrms. On
the other hand, the proponents of regulation argue that it may not be feasible to impose penalties
(in litigation or in terms of lost reputation) that are high enough to insure honest disclosure. In
addition, shareholders face free rider problems in monitoring. In principle either theory could be
correct, so empirical evidence is necessary to help resolve this controversy.
This paper analyzes the consequences of the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments on the stock
returns of aﬀected companies. Notably, this legislation was the last major imposition of mandatory
disclosure regulations in US equity markets but its consequences have gone unstudied. The 1964
Amendments required some ﬁrms traded on the Over the Counter (OTC) market that had been
free of all mandatory disclosure requirements to comply with four diﬀerent types of disclosure.
Speciﬁcally, these ﬁrms had to: (1) register with the SEC; (2) provide quarterly updates on their
ﬁnancial position, such as audited balance sheets and income statements; (3) issue detailed proxy
statements to shareholders, and (4) report on insider holdings and trades. Importantly, there
were stiﬀ statutory penalties associated with misstatements and the SEC was granted the power
to investigate and issue ﬁnes. The Amendments also required a diﬀerent set of OTC ﬁrms that
had been complying with requirements (1) and (2) to begin issuing detailed proxy statements and
reporting on insider holdings and trades.
The credibility of the analysis is aided by the availability of ﬁrms that were unaﬀected by this
legislation. In particular, two separate sets of OTC ﬁrms and all ﬁrms traded on the New York
and American Stock Exchanges were unaﬀected by the legislation. The beneﬁt of this multitude of
aﬀected and unaﬀected groups is that it allows for multiple estimates of the eﬀect of the mandatory
reporting requirements.
One reason that an empirical analysis of the 1964 Amendments may not have been under-
1T h ed e b a t ea b o u tt h ee ﬃciency of mandated disclosure laws extends back to at least the vigorous exchange
between Stigler (1964) Friend and Herman (1964).
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in machine-readable form. Using hard copies of Barron’s newspapers from the 1960’s and supple-
menting that with numerous other sources covering ﬁrms traded in the OTC market, we attempt
to create the equivalent of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data set that is
commonly used in empirical studies of ﬁnancial markets. The resulting data ﬁle contains informa-
tion on share prices, dividends, stock splits, ﬁnancial information, and SEC ﬁling status for OTC
companies from 1963 through 1966.
We exploit the structure of the 1964 Amendments and the timing of its passage to devise a
test of its consequences. Speciﬁcally, we classify ﬁrms into aﬀected and unaﬀected groups. These
classiﬁcations are based on the ﬁrm characteristics two years before the legislation’s passage in
order to abstract from the possibility that ﬁrms endogenously choose membership in the aﬀected or
unaﬀected groups. We then compare the returns of the aﬀected groups to those of the unaﬀected
groups from the beginning of 1963 when eﬀorts to extend mandatory disclosure were initiated until
the legislation became law at the end of August of 1964. We argue that during this period, the
probability of the extension of mandatory disclosure requirements to the aﬀected groups increased
steadily and eventually became one. Because equity markets are forward looking, we suspect the
main eﬀects of the law will be limited to this pre-law window where the expectation of passage was
increasing.
Our basic ﬁnding is that ﬁrms that were required to begin mandatory disclosure due to the
Amendments had positive abnormal returns in the period leading up to the passage of the law.
This ﬁnding holds after diﬀerencing out the returns of unaﬀected ﬁrms and adjusting for the market
return and the two Fama-French factors and a momentum factor. Speciﬁcally, the group of ﬁrms
that were required to engage in all four forms of mandatory disclosure for the ﬁrst time had a
cumulative abnormal excess return of roughly 20% during the pre-law period. The second aﬀected
group, which was required to begin issuing detailed proxy statements and reporting on insider
holdings and trades, had cumulative abnormal excess returns of approximately 10%. The eﬀect on
the ﬁrst group would be judged strongly statistically signiﬁcant by conventional criteria, while the
ﬁndings for the second group are marginally signiﬁcant.
We also study stock returns after the 1964 law was passed in order to further investigate the
eﬀects of the law. This also allows us to probe the validity of our research design and, more
speciﬁcally, to evaluate our identifying assumption that the aﬀected groups would not have had
abnormal excess returns during 1963 and early 1964 in the absence of the law.
We ﬁnd that from the time the law was passed through the initial disclosures of aﬀected ﬁrms,
the aﬀected groups continued to outperform the unaﬀected groups. As we discuss in detail, the
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expectations about the information that was revealed in this period. While we argue that these
results do not invalidate our ﬁndings about the pre-law period, we are also uncomfortable assigning
these post-law returns to the law.
We also exploit the availability of a third period after the law has passed and after the vast
majority of new ﬁlers have registered with the SEC. In this period there is no new information about
the law or about which ﬁrms will comply with its requirements. For these reasons, we believe that
this period provides the best opportunity to judge the validity of our approach. We ﬁnd that
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that either of the aﬀected groups have zero abnormal excess
returns in this period. This provides reassuring evidence on the validity of our research design and
lends credibility to the possibility that the 1964 Amendments are the causal reason for the positive
abnormal returns during the pre-law window
Finally, we present some preliminary evidence from event studies on the immediate consequences
of registering with the SEC soon after the 1964 Amendments. First, we study returns around the
date of initial registrations. We show that at least some of the post-law excess returns of aﬀected
ﬁrms were centered around the time of their ﬁrst ﬁling with the SEC under the 1964 Amendments.
Second, we brieﬂy explore to what degree increased liquidity was responsible for the eﬀects of the
law on stock prices. We show that there was a reduction in bid/ask spreads among aﬀected ﬁrms
upon registration with the SEC, but that the eﬀect was fairly small. It appears unlikely that
expectations of increased liquidity alone drove the equity market eﬀects that we uncover.
Our results suggest that for shareholders’ the beneﬁts of the 1964 Amendments far outweighed
the cost of complying with this law. The implication is that prior to 1964 managers of aﬀected
ﬁrms withheld information from shareholders, or were unable to disclose it in a credible manner,
although shareholders valued this information. One interpretation of this evidence is that the
Amendments allowed shareholders to discipline managers in ways either cheaper or more eﬀective
than were possible prior to the law. Even if this is the case, we cannot rule out the possibility that
insiders lost an amount equal to or greater than that gained by shareholders.
There are a number of scenarios where the loss to shareholders from management’s diversion of
resources is greater than insiders’ monetary gain. One example is “empire building” acquisitions or
diversiﬁcation into new lines of business, which may provide utility to company managers who enjoy
being in charge of larger ﬁrm but have a substantial negative net present value to shareholders.
Another example is when a positive net present value project is simply not undertaken because the
fraction of proﬁts shareholders expect to be paid is too low to cover the up-front investment cost.
In this case both insiders and outsiders are hurt from the inability of insiders to commit to not
3
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is the reduced liquidity of stocks caused by suspected insider trading. In summary, however, the
ﬁnding of substantial abnormal stock returns is a necessary, but not suﬃcient, condition for a
positive welfare eﬀect.
In the next section, we describe prior theoretical views on the value of mandatory disclosure and
outline a model that helps frame our empirical analysis. In section 3, we provide some historical
background on disclosure regulation in U.S. equity markets, explain in more detail why the 1964
Amendments provides a unique opportunity to study the eﬀects of mandatory disclosure, and
discuss related empirical studies. Sections 4 and 5 describe our data and our empirical methodology,
respectively. The main empirical results are presented and interpreted in section 6. The results of
event studies of the eﬀect of registration on stock price and liquidity are in Section 7. Section 8
concludes and discusses future research.
2 Theoretical Background
One traditional view of economists studying securities market regulation, often attributed to Stigler
(1964) and Coase (1960), is that government intervention in securities markets is at best ineﬀective
and, at worst, damaging. Proponents of this view argue that private contracts combined with the
possibility of litigation, between shareholders on the one side and managers, underwriters, auditors,
and analysts on the other, is a cost eﬀective way to ensure proper conduct by the parties involved
in securities market transactions. Such private enforcement works particularly well when those in
possession of superior information are concerned about their reputation due to repeated interactions
with the market. In such a setting, the better informed will voluntarily and truthfully disclose all
relevant information to the point where additional information is not socially beneﬁcial.
These views imply that ﬁrms eﬃciently limit the information they disclose. Thus, a ﬁrm’s
failure to provide some information must reﬂect a high costs of provision, lack of value relevance, or
valid concerns that competitors may beneﬁt from its release. Thus, mandatory disclosure legislation
must either be inconsequential or cause ﬁrms to release a suboptimal amount of information.2
An alternative view posits that incomplete contracts and the high costs of enforcing private
contracts may create an environment where mandatory disclosure regulation is welfare enhancing.
There are at least three examples of why this may be the case. First, the cost of lawsuits induces
2See Verrecchia (2001) for a review of the theoretical ﬁnancial disclosure literatures in accounting, economics, and
ﬁnance. Disclosure is also widely studied by legal scholars. See Easterbrook and Fischel (1984) for a discussion of the
theoretical and empirical evidence in favor of mandatory national disclosure rules versus other forms of regulation
aimed at preventing securities fraud.
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problems in deciding whether to bring suit. Second, Glaeser and Shleifer (2003) argue that while
regulations that mandate the costly provision of information may not be preferable on cost grounds,
they are less vulnerable to subversion than litigation. The additional information provided under
the regulatory regime implies a higher probability of detection, which assures compliance with lower
ﬁnes. This contrasts with more cost eﬃcient private litigation where misbehavior is detected with a
lower probability and the necessary ﬁnes are correspondingly higher. In such cases the insiders sued
have much larger incentives to bribe or subvert the process in some other way. Third, regulators
may be more specialized and thus better at detecting misbehavior than judges.
Our analysis seeks to shed light on the net beneﬁts to shareholders of an important piece of
U.S. mandatory disclosure law, the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments. In a recent paper, Shleifer
and Wolfenzon (2002) model ﬁnancial markets when government regulation reduces insiders ability
to divert ﬁrm resources to themselves. Their starting point is that private contracts cannot set
the penalty for expropriation high enough to eﬀectively deter malfeasance. The model is useful
for our evaluation problem, because it illustrates the beneﬁts to shareholders of reduced diversion.
Furthermore, the model’s penalty to insiders for getting caught stealing can be thought of more
generally as a distortionary eﬀect of misbehavior which reduces the total pie available to sharehold-
ers and insiders (examples of such distortions were given in the introduction). Finally, the general
equilibrium version of the model illustrates possible additional welfare eﬀects of the law.
As Shleifer and Wolfenzon point out, their model combines the basic economics of crime models
(see, for example, Becker (1968)) with the basic agency models (Jensen and Meckling (1976)).
The model, while quite simple, is consistent with a large set of empirical relationships between
investor protection and securities markets. We brieﬂys k e t c has i m p l i ﬁe dv e r s i o no ft h eS h l e i f e r
and Wolfenzon (2002) model and state the relevant results, as we interpret them, that apply to our
empirical analysis.
Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) consider an economy with many risk-neutral entrepreneurs.3 In
period 1, an entrepreneur (E) starts a company and contributes RE ≤ W of her own funds to
the ﬁrm. In return for fraction x of future cash ﬂow, she raises RM from the market and invests
I = RM + RE in the company. In period 2, the company generates (1 + g)I of gross cash ﬂow.
Investments in an alternative security return 1+i. The entrepreneur can attempt to divert some
of this cash ﬂow to herself before paying the rest out as dividends.
3The welfare implications of the model focus on new businesses, so we concentrate the discussion on “entrepre-
neurs.” However, the distribution eﬀects of the model apply just as well to other insiders, such as entrenched managers
or majority shareholders, that may be able to divert resources to themselves.
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much she invests relative to outsiders.4 The entrepreneur diverts a fraction, d,o fc a s hﬂow to herself.
She is caught with probability knon if she does not make ﬁnancial disclosures and kdis >k non if
she does. If caught, she returns diverted funds and pays a ﬁne that is increasing in the amount
diverted. Let d∗(x∗,k) be the optimal diversion function for the entrepreneur given how much of
the ﬁrm she chooses to keep (1 − x∗) and the expected state of disclosure rules (k).
Consider ﬁrst the case of ex post mandatory disclosure —t h a ti s ,t h ee ﬀects on a ﬁrm that is
established in a period where disclosure is not mandatory and it is not expected to become manda-
tory. The period 1 price of the ﬁrm’s stock is based on the common expectation of d∗(x∗
non,knon)





the portion of the cash ﬂow rights the entrepreneur will sell if she expects to not have to make
any ﬁnancial disclosures. Now suppose that after the ﬁrm is set up in period 1, but before both
the paying of dividends and any diversion in period 2, the government requires all entrepreneurs to
make substantial ﬁnancial disclosures. As a result, the entrepreneur now chooses (and the market
expects) diversion of d∗(x∗
non,kdis).
Under reasonable assumptions, it can be shown that the expected value of diversion to the
entrepreneur is decreasing in k. This is for two reasons. First, the entrepreneur diverts less
because of the lower expected beneﬁt and higher expected cost of attempted diversion (that is,
∂d∗(x,k)
∂k < 0). Second, the probability of getting caught goes up. Given that kdis >k non,t h i s
suggests that diversion will go down after mandatory increases in ﬁnancial disclosure. As a result
of the change in shareholder disclosure rules, the value of the stock receives a one-time increase of
(1+g)I
1+i [(1 − knon)d∗





non,kdis).T h a t
is, value increases by the discounted value of reduced diversion and increased recovery of diverted







This example of ex post mandatory disclosure, with an exogenous and unexpected change
in disclosure policy, suggests the imposition of disclosure may generate positive abnormal excess
returns for ﬁrms that were set up without expectation of mandatory disclosure and that were
still operating when the law was enacted. While the existence of abnormal excess returns when
mandated disclosure is imposed would certainly document that information provided is valuable,
such a ﬁnding would not, by itself, document that increased disclosure improved welfare. Excess
4Therefore, an eﬃcient market for corporate control would take away the opportunity for diversion. Alternatively,
we could assume the entrepreneur will always invest enough relative to outsiders that she always remains in control.
In this case, in addition to the standard large shareholder/small shareholder conﬂict (see, for example, Burkart,
Gromb and Panunzi (1997)) we would be allowing the large shareholder to attempt to engage in fund diversion that
the government declares to be illegal.
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to another (the outside investor). However, it is also possible that reduced diversion by existing
ﬁrms could generate welfare improvements. This would occur if the act of diversion is costly (e.g.,
entrepreneurs may only be able to keep a fraction of each diverted dollar) or if ﬁnes are deadweight
losses.
Within the Shleifer-Wolfenzon framework, welfare gains could also be generated through the
eﬀect of ex ante mandatory disclosure on new investment projects that rely on ﬁnancing from
equity markets. Rather than welfare improvements coming from a reduction in wasteful diversion,
they would stem from the fact that reduced opportunities for diversion can lead to more eﬃcient
investment in productive resources. Increased disclosure tilts entrepreneurs’ incentives toward less
diversion and increases their demand for outside funds. If the supply of funds is less than perfectly
elastic, the increase in demand pushes up the equilibrium interest rate. This induces entrepreneurs
with marginally proﬁtable projects in the absence of disclosure regulation to not start their projects
and instead invest their funds in higher quality projects of other entrepreneurs. As a result, projects
with low g will not be funded and the average project that receives funding will be of higher quality
(that is, will have higher g). Because the average project is of a higher quality, investors gain.
In the Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) model this welfare gain relies on imperfect capital mobility
across countries.
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that expected diversion is reﬂe c t e di ns t o c kp r i c e su n d e r
any of these regimes. So, while stock values, amount owned by insiders, and number of ﬁrms
that go public are all aﬀected by diversion, stock returns are not aﬀected as long as the disclosure
regime is constant. We do not expect any diﬀerence in returns between ﬁrms subject to mandatory
disclosure and those not subject to disclosure either before or after the change in disclosure rules.
Rather, we would expect the shift to mandatory disclosure to lead to a one-time gain in the price
of ﬁrms that shift from not disclosing to disclosing.
3 B a c k g r o u n do nF e d e r a lD i s c l o s u r eR e g u l a t i o n sa n daN e wR e -
search Design
Our empirical analysis examines the impact of the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments on the stock
returns of aﬀected ﬁrms. In the context of the previous section’s model, we interpret this law as
increasing the probability that diversion by insiders will be detected, or speciﬁcally as in increase
from knon to kdis. This section provides a brief history of securities laws before the 1964 Amend-
ments and how the structure of the legislation and the timing of its passage and implementation
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empirical studies.
3.1 The 1933 Securities Act and 1934 Securities Exchange Act
Prior to 1933, the Federal Government was essentially not involved in securities regulation.5 Some
states regulated brokerages, but there were no rules governing ﬁrms that issue securities. The only
regulation of publicly traded ﬁrms came from rules imposed by securities exchanges. For example,
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) required ﬁrms to show proper practices before they could list
on the exchange and once listed they had to make important and regular disclosures to shareholders.
However, the NYSE rules were enforced inconsistently. Further, there was essentially no regulation
of ﬁrms traded Over the Counter (OTC). Although there were many examples of securities frauds
both on and oﬀ exchanges prior to the Depression, proposals to add more Federal oversight were
never seriously considered.
The 1933 Securities Act and 1934 Securities Exchange Act marked the ﬁrst substantive federal
regulation of securities markets. These Acts speciﬁed four forms of mandated disclosure that some
publicly traded companies were required to comply with. As we detail below, the Acts’ requirements
did not apply equally to all categories of ﬁrms. The ﬁrst type of mandated disclosure requires any
ﬁrm making a new or secondary oﬀering to ﬁle a registration statement and send a prospectus
to purchasers. The registration and prospectus statements include a “Schedule A” with detailed
ﬁnancial information (including at least three years of balance sheet and income statement data)
and descriptions of the ﬁrm’s business, oﬃcers, costs of issuing the security, and intended use of
any capital.
The second type of required disclosure is that ﬁrms listed on the NYSE and the American Stock
Exchange (AMEX) must ﬁle annual (Form 10-K) and semi-annual (9-K) reports with the SEC, as
well as report whenever a material event occurred (8-K). A 1936 law extended these periodic
disclosure requirements to companies that issued securities through an initial or secondary oﬀering
after May 1936, regardless of whether they were traded on an exchange.6 Consequently, periodic
reporting was required of all listed ﬁrms and of those large OTC ﬁrms that had issued securities
after May 1936.
5This section draws heavily from Seligman (1995), as well as New York Times and Wall Street Journal articles
from the 1960’s.
6The speciﬁc requirement was that any company making a primary or secondary oﬀering that increased the total
market capitalization of all classes of securities issued by the company to above $2 million had to ﬁle a registration
statement and periodic reports with the SEC. Such a ﬁrm could cease ﬁling these reports if and while the value of
the newly issued security class issued dropped below $1 million as of the last issue of the security.
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of shareholder meetings or votes and sets minimum standards for information provided in these
statements. In particular, these statements are required to report the qualiﬁcations of directors
and nominees for directors, executive compensation, and transactions between the company and
its oﬃcers or directors. The fourth type obliges ﬁrms to list the identities of oﬃcers, directors, and
large shareholders. Further, they must report these individuals’ holdings of the company’s equities
and provide monthly statements of any changes. The Act also allows companies to recover any
proﬁts that an insider realizes from the purchase and sale of the company’s stock in any period of
less than six months. The third and fourth types of mandated disclosure only applied to ﬁrms on
exchanges, leaving all OTC ﬁrms uncovered.7
The 1933 and 1934 Acts were revolutionary forays into the regulation of securities markets, but
their limitation was that all ﬁrms were not regulated equally. In particular, mandated disclosure
requirements varied with ﬁrms’ industry, the date they issued securities and whether they were
listed on the NYSE or American Stock Exchange (AMEX). Harvard Law Professor Louis Loss
(1983) wrote8:
For thirty years after enactment of the Exchange Act there was a double standard
of investor protection — a standard that resulted, more by accident than by design,
from the piecemeal adoption of the SEC statutes but that nevertheless glowed with an
incandescent illogic: if an investor happened to be a stockholder of a listed company,
or a public utility holding company or a subsidiary of such a company or an investment
company, he had the protections aﬀorded by the reporting requirements as well as (with
some exceptions) the proxy rules and the insider-trading provisions. If, on the other
hand, he happened to hold a security that did not fall within any of these categories
but that had been oﬀered to the public and registered under the 1933 Act since 1936,
he was likely to have current information...[due] to the reporting requirements of the
Exchange Act but not to the proxy or insider-trading provisions. The third investor,
who held an unlisted security in an industrial corporation that had not had any public
7The insurance and banking industries received preferential treatment under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. In the
case of insurance companies, the legislation imposed slightly less burdensome periodic reporting requirements. The
Acts “temporarily” exempted banks until appropriate disclosure rules could be determined. The rules were never
written, however, and the temporary exemption lasted until 1964. Banks and insurance companies that chose to list
on exchanges were not exempt from rules imposed by exchanges. It is noteworthy that most of these ﬁrms remained
on the OTC market.
8Loss was President Kennedy’s ﬁrst choice to head the SEC. When Loss declined, Kennedy appointed William
Cary.
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whole series of SEC statutes might just as well not have existed except for a few fraud
provisions, no matter how large the corporation or how widely distributed its securities.
(pp. 462-463)
Approximately three decades later the passage of the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments aimed to
rectify the seemingly arbitrary inequities in regulatory intensity across categories of ﬁrms. It is these
eﬀorts that form the basis of this paper’s examination of the consequences of mandated disclosure
laws. Before we describe the exact form of these Amendments, the next subsection describes some
of the consequences of the system of diﬀerential reporting requirements that prevailed for three
decades.
3.2 The Impacts of Diﬀerential Reporting Requirements
In response to complaints of fraud and manipulation on securities markets, Congress commissioned
a study in 1961 of the operations of securities markets in the US. This study took over two years
to complete and became known as the Special Study of the Securities Markets. It found that the
existing system of diﬀerential reporting requirements had at least two undesirable eﬀects on US
equity markets.
First, the management of companies traded on the OTC market were not forthcoming with
important details about ﬁrms’ operations. For example, the Special Study said that roughly half
of the complaint letters that the SEC received were from investors who either could not obtain
information about a company in which they had invested or felt that the information sent to them
was inadequate.
In a 1962 survey, the SEC randomly sampled one ﬁfth of the OTC securities in which trades
had been made during the last quarter of 1961. Of 1,965 OTC ﬁrms approached, 1,618 replied.
1227 had assets above $1 million, of which about half had at least 500 shareholders. The survey
found that:
1. More than a quarter of the ﬁrms did not provide any reports on the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial position
or results in that year.
2. In 73 percent of proxy solicitations for voting on the Board of Directors, the shareholders were
not told the names of the nominees. The proxy solicitations listed the directors’ qualiﬁcations
in only 11 percent of the proxy solicitations. Thus, in the vast majority of cases, shareholders
were asked to vote blindly for current management or their nominees.
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4. 29 percent of the ﬁrms did not solicit proxies before shareholder meetings.
These ﬁndings applied to all OTC ﬁrms. It seems reasonable to assume that the frequency of
poor communication between management and shareholders were disproportionately concentrated
among the ﬁrms that were completely free of SEC disclosure requirements.
Second, the legislative diﬀerences in mandated disclosure requirements appeared to distort ﬁrms’
decisions on where to list their shares. The Special Study concluded that the system of diﬀerential
regulation aﬀected ﬁrms’ decisions on where to list (Special Study, Part III, p. 16). Loss (1983) also
argued that regulation aﬀected listing decisions when he said, “For, just as surely as water ﬂows
downhill, business will move from a regulated to an unregulated market” (p. 464.) Prominent
examples of ﬁrms that chose not to list on exchanges prior to the 1960’s, but joined exchanges
shortly before or after the Act took eﬀect, included Time Inc., G.D. Searle, and Weyerhauser.
Also, virtually all major banks remained unlisted until after the law was passed.
By all accounts, many companies that met the listing requirements of the more liquid New
York and American Stock Exchanges chose to keep their shares on the OTC market, although
this may not have been in shareholders’ best interests. Despite repeated eﬀo r t s ,w ew e r eu n a b l e
to determine the precise listing requirements of the NYSE and AMEX in this period. However,
market capitalization has always been an important factor in determining eligibility for listing
on both exchanges. In the subsequent analysis, there are 228 ﬁrms that were completely free
of disclosure requirements before the 1964 Amendments. We were able to ascertain the market
capitalization of 217 of these ﬁr m si nt h eb e g i n n i n go f1 9 6 3 . 1 8 4o ft h e s eﬁrms, or roughly 85%,
had a market capitalization that exceeded the 25th percentile market capitalization of ﬁrms on the
AMEX and NYSE measured at the same time.
3.3 Negotiation and Passage of the 1964 Amendments
We now trace out the time line of important events that led to the passage of the Securities Acts
Amendments in August, 1964. In the subsequent analysis, the primary outcome variable is equity
returns. Because equity markets are forward looking, any eﬀect of the law should be concentrated
in the period preceding its passage. Table 1 summarizes the key dates that are described in this
subsection.
Before 1963, politicians and the public expressed little interest in revising the 1933 and 1934
Acts. On a fairly regular basis, SEC staﬀ, a few legislators, or some other prominent public ﬁgure
would call for an extension of the mandated reporting requirements to all OTC ﬁrms. However,
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For example, Senator Frear of Delaware introduced a bill to extend mandatory disclosure in 1949,
but no action was taken because attention turned to higher priorities such as the Korean War
(Special Study, part 3, page 7.) In 1961, the SEC’s budget was increased and William Cary, the
new head of the SEC, called for the agency to be granted new powers, including the extension
of disclosure rules to all OTC securities. However, there was little evidence that the Kennedy
Administration was willing to push for substantive legislative changes in its ﬁr s ty e a ri np o w e r .I n
our examination of newspapers, we failed to ﬁnd any evidence that market participants thought
that Cary’s calls foreshadowed substantive legal changes.
Also in 1961, there was a scandal on the American Stock Exchange. It was discovered that
t h ec o m p a n yR ea n dR eo ﬀered special options grants to the individuals that determined whether
the company could list on the AMEX. This scandal crystallized feelings that US securities markets
were not fair and in September 1961, the Commission was authorized by Congress to “make a study
and investigation of the adequacy, for the protection of investors, of the rules of ... exchanges and
national securities associations" (press release on SEC website). The mandate to the SEC was to
examine the functioning of US equity markets generally — not necessarily with a focus on OTC
ﬁrms. Based on our reading of newspapers from this period, it was far from certain whether the
study was meant as more than a means to defuse public concerns about the operation of equity
markets.
The ﬁr s tp a r to ft h eSpecial Study was released in April, 1963 and it appeared to change
the political climate. The Special Study was accompanied by a letter from William Cary stating
that the SEC would make several legislative recommendations, including expanding the disclosure
requirements for OTC securities. The Senate quickly reacted to this event. On July 9, 1963, a
subcommittee unanimously approved a bill extending disclosure rules to all OTC ﬁrms. The release
of the second installment of the Special Study on July 17, 1963 recommended a major overhaul of
the OTC markets. Less than 2 weeks later on July 30, 1963, the full Senate passed the Securities
Act Amendment which held OTC ﬁrms with at least $1 million of assets and 500 shareholders to
the same disclosure rules as the 1934 Act imposes on securities traded on the NYSE and AMEX.9
The bill moved on to the House, where it stalled. The size requirements were contentious. For
example, some argued that there should not be an asset minimum and others thought that the
shareholder ﬂoor should be lowered to 300. Further, insurance companies argued that they were
9The staﬀ that put together the Special Study argued that all OTC ﬁrms with at least 300 shareholders should
be forced to comply with the mandated disclosure requirements imposed on ﬁr m so nl i s t e de x c h a n g e sa n dt h a tt h e r e
should be no asset test. This would have forced approximately 5,500 ﬁrms of the roughly 25,000 OTC ﬁrms to comply.
The cut-oﬀs in the bill passed by the Senate were endorsed by the SEC commissioners.
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Banks contended that their supervision by the Comptroller of the Currency was suﬃcient, although
the Comptroller had no mandated disclosure rules. While these issues proved diﬃcult to resolve,
the bill’s general principle of increased disclosure was never seriously contested.10
The solution to the slowdown in the House came in late January and early February of 1964
when President Johnson made two public endorsements of the legislation before the House. Johnson
applied his famous skills of persuasion and the controversy over the particular provisions began to
evaporate.11 A House subcommittee passed the bill on March 19, 1964. It was soon evident that
it would become law and in May Cary announced that he would resign soon, noting that his work
was complete. On August 5 and 6, 1964 the full House and Senate passed identical versions of the
bill, thereby sending it on to Johnson who signed it into law on August 20, 1964.
The most important provision of the law was that it extended all four forms of mandated
disclosure to new categories of ﬁrms. It speciﬁcally required that any ﬁrm that had at least 750
shareholders and $1 million of assets as of the last day of its ﬁrst ﬁscal year to end after July 1, 1964
(or any year after that) must register with the SEC within 120 days of the end of the ﬁscal year.
In order to give companies more time to prepare their initial statements and to give themselves a
chance to prepare for the onslaught of new ﬁlings, the SEC extended the deadline to April 30, 1965
for ﬁrms whose ﬁrst ﬁscal year end was before the end of 1964. The ﬁrst wave of new ﬁlings with
the SEC took place in April, 1965, but ﬁr s ti n f o r m a t i o nd i s c l o s u r e sw e r em a d ea sl a t ea sO c t o b e r
31, 1965. The compliance date for ﬁrms that met the asset test and had between 500 and 750
shareholders was the last day of its ﬁrst ﬁscal year to end after July 1, 1966.12 Firms with fewer
than 500 shareholders and/or $1 million in assets were unaﬀected by the 1964 Amendments.
10We have found no public arguments against the Act on the grounds that disclosure was a bad idea. It was
probably diﬃcult to make such a case because, according to Seligman (1995), the available evidence seemed to
indicate that the “vast majority of securities fraud occurred among ﬁrms not subject to the SEC’s periodic reporting
requirements” (p. 313-4). There was some resistance by business groups such as the US Chamber of Commerce and
National Association of Manufacturers on the grounds that compliance would be costly and that business should be
free of regulatory burdens. However, Edwin Etherington, the president of the American Stock Exchange, estimated
the annual compliance costs at approximately $1500 to $3000 for most OTC companies that were to be covered by
the bill and Congress seemed to ﬁnd this estimate compelling.
11Largely due to the actions of House Commerce Committee Chairman Oren Harris, the securities bill was not
seriously considered in the House until the Spring of 1964. Seligman (1995) suggests that Harris eventually helped
enact the legislation in return for Johnson appointing Harris to be a Federal district judge (which Johnson did in
1965.)
12The Special Study survey of OTC ﬁrms indicates that, as of 1961, approximately 32% of OTC ﬁrms had enough
assets and shareholders that they would be bound by the new disclosure rules initially with another 8% becoming
bound two years later. These ﬁrms account for a substantial majority of all OTC ﬁrm assets.
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The structure and timing of the passage and implementation of the 1964 Amendments provide
the framework for a compelling research design to evaluate the impacts of the 1964 Amendments.
This subsection describes how the legislation aﬀected diﬀerent categories of ﬁrms and created three
diﬀerent periods in which we can test for the law’s eﬀect and perform validation exercises of our
approach.
Firm Variation. An appealing feature of the 1964 Amendments from an evaluation perspective
is the availability of cross-sectional variation in which ﬁrms were aﬀected by the change in mandated
disclosure laws. We use the structure of the 1964 Amendments to divide ﬁrms into groups that
were aﬀected or unaﬀected by the law, based on their pre-legislation characteristics and whether
they were already covered by the 1933 and 1934 Acts. We then impose a central assumption.
Speciﬁcally, our analysis takes as a given that after adjustment for standard covariates (i.e., the
overall market return and 2 Fama-French factors and a momentum factor), the unaﬀected groups
are a valid counterfactual for the stock returns of the aﬀected ﬁrms in the absence of the law.
The 1964 Amendments caused two groups of ﬁrms traded over-the-counter to become subject
to the same four types of disclosure requirements as ﬁrms on the NYSE and AMEX. The ﬁrst
group consists of ﬁrms that switched from being free of all SEC reporting requirements to having
to comply with all four types of disclosure. We refer to this as the “fully aﬀected” or 0-4 group.13
It is comprised of ﬁrms that only issued shares before 1936, or issued shares after 1936 but without
bringing the total market value of the share class above $2 million, had at least 500 shareholders,
and had at least $1 million in assets. The second aﬀected group is labeled “partially aﬀected” or 2-4.
These ﬁrms were required to comply with the SEC registration and periodic reporting requirements
before 1964 by virtue of having had a primary or secondary oﬀering of shares since 1936 bringing
the total market value of a share class above $2 million, had at least 500 shareholders, and had at
least $1 million in assets. The 1964 Amendments compelled them to also comply with the proxy
and insider trading types of disclosure. This group can be compared to the fully aﬀected group to
estimate the joint eﬀect of the registration and periodic reporting requirements.
There are two groups of ﬁrms that were unaﬀected by the 1964 legislation. The ﬁrst is the
“unlisted unaﬀected” group. This group, which consists of ﬁrms that traded OTC at the time of
the 1964 Amendments and that were not subject to any new mandatory disclosure as a result of
the law, is actually comprised of two subgroups. The ﬁrst subgroup is those ﬁrms that were free of
13The number before the dash refers to the number of types of disclosure that the ﬁrm was required to comply
with before the 1964 Amendments, while the number after the dash indicates the number of forms of disclosure that
they were subject to after the new legislation was in force.
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only issued shares before 1936, or issued shares after 1936 but without bringing the total market
value of the share class above $2 million, and fell below the 500 shareholders and/or $1 million in
assets ﬂoor. The second subgroup of the unlisted unaﬀected group is ﬁrms that were subject to
the registration and periodic reporting requirements before and after the 1964 Amendments. This
subgroup is labeled 2-2. These ﬁrms were below either the shareholders ﬂo o ro ra s s e t sﬂo o ro ft h e
1964 Amendments.
The second unaﬀe c t e dg r o u pi sc o m p r i s e do ft h eﬁrms that trade on the NYSE and AMEX.
This “listed unaﬀected” group was subject to all 4 forms of disclosure before and after 1964. These
ﬁrms generally had higher market values than OTC ﬁrms. We therefore create two subsamples
of the “listed unaﬀected” group that are intended to serve as unaﬀected comparisons for the fully
aﬀected and partially aﬀected groups, respectively. Each of the subsamples are chosen to match
one of the aﬀected group’s median market capitalization. We describe the selection process further
below. Table 2 summarizes the diﬀerent aﬀected and unaﬀected groups, as well as their disclosure
requirements before and after the 1964 Amendments.14
Two details about our method for assigning individual ﬁrms to these groups bear mentioning.
First, we use 1962 data on assets, shareholders, and ﬁling status to assign ﬁrms to the various
groups, which predates even the ﬁrst serious discussions about passing the legislation that would
become the 1964 Amendments. This is preferable to relying on 1963 or 1964 data or using ﬁrms’
post Amendments ﬁling status, because we want the estimated impact of the law to be purged
of any bias associated with ﬁrms endogenously choosing membership in the aﬀected or unaﬀected
groups.
Second by deﬁning our aﬀected group in advance of the ﬁl i n gd a t ew eh a v en o tc o n d i t i o n e do n
actual ﬁling status. In light of the ﬁnding that many OTC ﬁrms appeared to have chosen to avoid
the mandatory disclosure requirements by failing to move to a listed exchange, it is reasonable to
suspect that some of these ﬁrms tried to avoid the Amendment’s requirements either legally (e.g.,
by reducing the number of shareholders below 500 or going private) or illegally (e.g., by refusing
to comply).15 Thus, our aﬀected groups are comprised of ﬁrms that do and do not subsequently
comply with the law. This is an advantage of our approach, because the policy parameter of
interest for a country that is considering implementing mandatory disclosure laws must account for
14Banks were treated like other ﬁrms in the 1964 Act, while insurance companies were exempted from mandatory
disclosure. We currently exclude both groups because the rules imposed on them by other regulators make it diﬃcult
to determine how much information they disclosed before and after the the 1964 Act.
15I ti sa l s op o s s i b l et h a ts o m eo ft h eﬁrms in our aﬀected group fell below the asset or shareholder limits by the
compliance date due to factors that are unrelated to the legislation.
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way, an analysis that estimates the eﬀect on ﬁrms that choose to comply would likely provide a
biased estimate of the eﬀe c to fal a wt h a ta p p l i e dt oac l a s so fﬁrms.
Time Variation. In the ideal event study, the event is a surprise to the aﬀected parties. This
is especially important when ﬁnancial markets are used to study the impact of an event, because
these markets are forward looking and quickly capitalize changes in expectations about the future.
As the previous subsection documented, the 1964 Amendments were the result of a long process
that can be traced back to at least the origins of the Special Study and perhaps longer. During
this period, the probability that the disclosure requirements would be extended to uncovered OTC
ﬁrms increased from some unknown level to something approaching one.
We deﬁne the event window as lasting from January 1, 1963 through August 24, 1964. Although
the Special Study was released on April 3, 1963, we suspect that its basic ﬁndings may have begun
to permeate the investment community earlier. How much earlier is unknown, so there is an
element of arbitrariness in the choice of January 1. The choice of August 24, 1964 as an end date
seems relatively uncontroversial. It is two weeks after Johnson signed the bill in order to allow full
d i s s e m i n a t i o no ft h en e w si nt h ep o p u l a t i o no fi n v e s t o r s .
We attempted to identify sub-periods when there were unexpected increases or decreases in
the probability of the legislation’s passage. The availability of such periods would allow for tighter
hypotheses that could more easily be refuted by the data. Ultimately, we were unable to precisely
identify true surprises so we cannot divide the event window into short periods of time where the
probability of passage was increasing or decreasing.16
Thus, we test the null hypothesis that the fully aﬀected and partially aﬀected groups had zero
abnormal excess returns in the period January 1, 1963 through August 24, 1964. A failure to reject
this null hypothesis is consistent with the notion that on average the disclosure requirements were
not expected to produce information that was valued by outside shareholders (after accounting for
compliance costs), either because this information was already being transmitted without govern-
ment interference or ﬁrms would evade compliance. A ﬁnding of positive abnormal excess returns
among our aﬀected groups would be consistent with the notion that the disclosure requirements
16As an example, we initially suspected that Johnson’s announcement that he supported the bill on January 22, 1964
represented a sharp increase in the probability of passage. That same day, Representative Harris made statements
indicating the House would soon act on the bill. Upon closer inspection, however, we found that the New York
Times had given relatively limited coverage to Johnson’s announcement. The relevant article was printed on page 50
and highlighted the fact that Johnson had not allocated any new funds to help enforce the proposed legislation. By
contrast, when Johnson more aggressively pushed for the bill as part of a February 5 “Special Message on Consumer
Interests”, the Times reported the endorsement prominently the next day and followed up with a February 9 story
declaring that the endorsement had made the prospects for the bill “suddenly bright.” Thus, it is unclear which
actions surprised the markets so we cannot form a precise hypothesis to test.
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to reduced scope for diversion by management.
We divide the period August 25, 1964 through December 31, 1966 into two periods, which are
referred to hereafter as Periods 2 and 3, respectively. Period 3 runs from November 2, 1965 through
the end of 1966 when our data ﬁle ends. We believe that this period provides the best opportunity
to judge the validity of our approach. This is because there was no new information about the
probability that the Amendments would be passed or enacted or about the ﬁnancial position of
the potentially aﬀected ﬁr m si nt h i sp e r i o d .R e c a l lt h a tﬁrms’ exact compliance date varied with
their ﬁscal year end but all ﬁr m sw i t hm o r et h a n7 5 0s h a r e h o l d e r sa n d$ 1m i l l i o ni na s s e t sw e r e
required to comply by the end of October 1965. Consequently, under the standard eﬃcient markets
hypothesis, a failure to reject the null of zero abnormal excess returns will provide support for our
research design and the interpretation of the diﬀerential period 1 returns as being due to the 1964
Amendments.
Period 2 runs from August 25, 1964 through November 1, 1965. In this period, ﬁrms were
required to begin to comply with the Amendment’s requirements. As with Period 1, our focus is
on a test of whether the aﬀected groups have abnormal excess returns relative to the unaﬀected
groups after adjustment for the standard factors. A rejection of the null of equal returns could have
at least three interpretations. First if the market had incorrectly expected that the amendments
would not be enforced (or that enforcement would be delayed, as it brieﬂy was for a subset of ﬁrms),
then prices may have been aﬀected by the increasing likelihood that the law would be enforced as
planned. If mandatory disclosure is valuable to shareholders, this scenario would imply a positive
abnormal excess return. Second it is possible that as of the end of August 1964, the market had
an incorrect estimate of the fraction of ﬁrms that would ﬁle or the mean ﬁnancial strength of
aﬀected ﬁr m sr e v e a l e di nt h er e g i s t r a t i o ns t a t e m e n t s .I nt h i sc a s e ,t h ea ﬀected groups could have
a positive or negative abnormal excess return, depending on the nature of the revelations relative
to expectations.
The third possibility is that the market correctly assumed that the law would be enacted and
also had correct expectations about the fraction of ﬁrms in the aﬀected group that would comply
with the law. Here, we would expect zero abnormal excess returns. Under this assumption, a
rejection of the null hypothesis would suggest that our approach is susceptible to falsely ﬁnding
abnormal excess returns and this would invalidate our research design. Overall, the interpretation
of the results for this period depends on one’s initial assumptions.
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This is far from the ﬁrst paper to study the eﬀects of changes in Federal (and other) mandatory
disclosure regulations in ﬁnancial markets. Numerous previous researchers have studied the eﬀects
of the increased disclosure requirements of the Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934.17
Some of the better known work in this area was designed to inﬂuence the securities regulation
policy debates of the early 1960’s. Important examples include Stigler’s (1964) attack on the need
for securities market regulation. Stigler (1964) looked at new issues in the pre-SEC and post-SEC
periods. Analyzing the average price and the variance in prices across issues, he concluded that the
laws had no eﬀect on stock prices and lowered variance only by discouraging high variance issues
from coming to market. Friend and Herman (1964) and Robbins and Werner (1964) defended the
SEC and argued that Stigler (1964) could not eﬀectively separate eﬀects of the 1933 and 1934 Acts
from changes in the market overall.
Later, Benston (1973) took advantage of the fact that the 1934 law required NYSE ﬁrms to
disclose their sales ﬁgures and that, prior to the law, some ﬁrms already disclosed this information
while others did not. While Benston (1973) did have a comparison group, disclosure of this one
piece of information might not be expected to have a large eﬀect on stock performance. Possibly
due to this weakness in his experiment, Benston (1973) found no eﬀect of the 1934 law on volatility.
Simon (1989) provided the strongest evidence that the early SEC Acts had a positive eﬀect on stock
markets. Using data from 1926-1940, she showed that issue-speciﬁc risk was signiﬁcantly lower in
the post-1933 period. She also compared IPO’s in bull markets before 1933 to those after 1933
and exploited diﬀerences in pre-1933 disclosure rules for NYSE and other exchanges. Simon (1989)
focused on risk for new issues and did not measure changes to price and volatility of existing issues.
Because of data limitations, no study of the 1930’s legislation has used the same empirical approach
that we use to study the impact diﬀerential impact on exchange-listed ﬁrms (the aﬀected group of
the 1930’s legislation) and OTC ﬁrms (the unaﬀected group at that time.) There may have been
relatively little impact, given that exchanges already had some disclosure requirements. However,
there is no reason such an undertaking could not be conducted by researchers who can gather
appropriate OTC data from that time.
There is a large literature studying the eﬀects of other changes in ﬁnancial disclosure.18 As
17Table 3 provides an overview of the samples, measures, and ﬁndings of several relevant papers studying the 1930’s
Securities Acts and other changes in disclosure.
18See Healy and Palepu (2001) for a review of the empirical ﬁnancial disclosure literature. There is also a substantial
body of work on the eﬀects of disclosure in non-ﬁnancial markets. A recent example is Jin and Leslie (2003) who
study the eﬀect of mandatory disclosure of restaurant health inspection scores using methodology similar to ours.
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strong or entirely consistent. In motivating their study of disclosure in Germany, they argue that
disclosure changes outside the United States provide better opportunities to study large changes.
We take a diﬀerent strategy in ﬁnding an important change in disclosure regulation — rather than go
o u t s i d et h eU . S . ,w eg ob a c ki nt i m e . 19 Our analysis also diﬀers from Leuz and Verrecchia (2000),
as well as many other papers in the disclosure literature, in that we focus primarily on a case of
mandatory disclosure.
Bushee and Leuz (2002) take an approach similar to ours by analyzing a noteworthy change
in SEC disclosure regulation and by using a control group of unaﬀected securities. They study
the OTC Bulletin Board (OTCBB), where rules similar to the 1934 Securities Act were enforced
beginning in 1999. Prior to the rule change, approximately two-thirds of OTCBB ﬁrms were too
small to be subject to SEC disclosure rules. That is, they were part of the “unlisted unaﬀected”
group after the 1964 Amendments. Bushee and Leuz (2002) ﬁnd that increased disclosure led to
increased liquidity (as proxied by share turnover, trading volume, number of days where trades
took place, and number of market makers) and decreased cost of capital. There are two important
diﬀerences between our study and Bushee and Leuz (2002). First, OTCBB ﬁrms had more discretion
over whether or not to adopt the new rules relative to most of the ﬁrms we study in 1964 because
they could choose to leave the OTCBB for less liquid markets. In fact, approximately three-quarters
of OTCBB ﬁrms who were newly required to ﬁle with the SEC chose to delist from the OTCBB.
One important ﬁnding of Bushee and Leuz (2002), therefore, is that many ﬁrms have a strong
preference for avoiding SEC disclosure requirements. The option to delist limits Bushee and Leuz’s
(2002) ability to study price and volatility eﬀects of changes in disclosure because not that many
ﬁrms actually changed their level of disclosure and because any market reaction is probably as
much a reaction to the ﬁrms’ decisions regarding disclosure as to disclosure itself. Secondly, the
OTCBB is a trivial portion of the U.S. equity market. The average and median nominal market
capitalization of aﬀected ﬁrms in the Bushee and Leuz (2002) sample is smaller than these same
statistics for aﬀected groups in our sample, despite forty years diﬀerence.20
To our knowledge, Ferrell (2003) is the only other empirical analysis of the 1964 Securities
Acts Amendments. Ferrell (2003) also studies the eﬀect of the 1964 law on OTC companies.
Ferrell (2003) focuses on volatility and correlation between individual ﬁrms and the overall market
19See Butler, Kraft and Weiss (2003) for another paper that uses SEC changes in the mid-1900’s to examine the
eﬀects of disclosure. They analyze SEC rule changes in 1955 and 1970 that forced exchange-listed ﬁrms to provide
more frequent ﬁnancial reports.
20The Dow Jones Industrial Average increased fourteen-fold in the time between the beginning of our sample and
the beginning of Bushee and Leuz’s (2002).
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but that synchronicity was unaﬀected. He also argues that the 1964 Amendments had little eﬀect
on stock returns. Our results are quite diﬀerent, which appears to be a result of our more precise
assignment of OTC ﬁrms to diﬀerent groups and to our focus on a shorter event window. Ferrell
focuses on ﬁrms from Barrons’ primary list of OTC ﬁrms, leaving out the (on average smaller ﬁrms)
from Barrons’ supplemental section and uses all listed ﬁrms as a comparison group. We use ﬁrms
from both Barrons’ lists and Ferrell’s sample is thus a subsample of ours. Ferrell argues that most
of the ﬁrms on the primary list newly had to comply with all four disclosure requirement of the
1964 Amendments. However, detailed ﬁrm lists in annual SEC publications show that about 73
percent of ﬁrms on the primary list already complied with the initial registration requirement and
periodic reporting of ﬁnancials as of 1963.21
Lo (2003) also takes an approach similar to ours in his analysis of the SEC’s 1992 extension
of executive compensation information that had to be disclosed. He studies how market values
changed in the eight months from the SEC’s initial announcement that they were considering an
extension until the detailed rules became known. He forms relatively aﬀected and unaﬀected groups
by using the amount of lobbying ﬁrms did to inﬂuence the SEC. Lo (2003) ﬁnds that increased
disclosure created shareholder value, which is consistent with a reduction in diversion.
Disclosure rules are not the only means by which regulators attempt to make markets more
eﬃcient. There is a literature that compares securities laws and institutions across countries to de-
termine what factors are most important in making a country’s markets eﬃcient. A recent example
is Porta, de Silanes and Shleifer (2002), who study securities laws and markets in 49 countries. They
argue that more developed and eﬃcient stock markets are associated with mandatory disclosure and
with holding ﬁrms that issue securities, as well as their investment advisors and accountants, liable
for misleading information. They ﬁnd no evidence that criminal penalties for ﬁnancial misdeeds
aﬀect market development. Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer (2001) draw similar conclusions from a
comparison of development of the Czech and Polish stock markets. These studies provide useful
general rules for what factors are associated with well developed markets. However, they generally
cannot evaluate speciﬁc disclosure policy choices because they do not distinguish clearly between
the eﬀects of various types of disclosure, they have very coarse measures of market eﬃciency, and
t h e yd on o tl o o ka ta n yw i t h i n - c o u n t r yc h a n g e s .
21Furthermore, about 13 percent of ﬁrms on the primary list were too small to have data for assets and shareholders
in Moody’s or other publicly available sources and were thus less likely to become aﬀected by the 1964 Amendments.
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4.1 Data Sources
To implement our analysis, we created the ﬁrst electronic data set containing information on secu-
rities traded Over the Counter (OTC) from 1963-1966. This database contains information on bid
and ask share prices, dividends, stock splits, whether the ﬁrms disclosed information to the SEC,
and ﬁnancial information for the subset of ﬁrms for which this was available. The forthcoming
Data Appendix will contain more details. We also use similar information for equities traded on
the American and New York Stock Exchanges (from CRSP and Compustat).
The basis of the analysis is a comparison of weekly returns across diﬀerent categories of ﬁrms
from 1963-66. The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP R °) database, which is the standard
source for historical equity returns data, only begins coverage of OTC ﬁrms in December 1972.
Therefore, we created our own database of OTC ﬁrms’ returns.
The resulting database is based upon the hand entry of data from 8 separate sources on OTC
ﬁrms and the CRSP electronic data ﬁle. We collected weekly bid and ask prices for OTC com-
panies from 1963-66 weekly publications of Barron’s. The relevant pages of this publication were
photocopied and these copies were then scanned. The image ﬁles were sent to Mascon Computer
Services (P)Ltd. of India. They hand entered the security name, the bid price, and the ask price
from each issue of Barron’s.
To create a panel data ﬁle of prices, we matched ﬁr m sa c r o s si s s u e so fBarron’s by using their
reported names. Elaborate checking was performed to minimize spurious exit of ﬁrms in cases
w h e r en a m ea b b r e v i a t i o n sd i ﬀered slightly between Barrons issues.22
We hand entered all dividend and stock split information from Standard and Poor’s Annual
Dividend Record. In particular, we started with a list of all the names of the ﬁrms in Barron’s for
each year and entered the amounts and dates of every cash, property, and liquidating dividend and
stock split. The S&P publication is an ideal data source for this information, because it aims to be
a “record of dividend payments on virtually every American and Canadian preferred and common
stock.”23 Approximately 80% of the ﬁrms in our sample of OTC ﬁrms were in the S&P book. We
22To avoid incorrect matches, we also assessed the quality of the match by checking for implausibly large changes
in the bid and ask prices between Barron’s issues. The roughly 500 largest weekly changes in price were investigated
by research assistants in the United States. These investigations included rechecking the Barron’s entries and the
stock split information, as well as verifying the match between ﬁr mn a m e sa c r o s si s s u e so fBarron’s. Any documented
errors were corrected. Otherwise, the observation was unchanged.
23The average number of ﬁrms covered in this publication during the 1961-68 period was 10,000. Notably, there
were roughly 2,000 ﬁrms on the American and New York Stock Exchanges in these years, so approximately 80% of
the entries were for OTC (and Canadian) ﬁrms.
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especially in cases where ﬁrms ceased operations.
These price and dividend data were then used to calculate the weekly returns for each company.
The ﬁrst step in this process was to adjust the stock prices for all stock splits. We adjusted the
dividends analogously. The returns were then calculated as the change in the mean of the bid and
ask price between consecutive weeks plus any cash dividends divided by the mean of the bid and
ask price in the ﬁrst of those weeks in 1963-66.
Securities that disappeared from Barron’s posed a particular challenge. In these cases, the ﬁrst
step was to ascertain the reason that the ﬁrm’s share price was no longer reported in Barron’s.
We relied on a myriad of sources for this task, including the Standard and Poor’s Annual Dividend
Record, National Stock Summary and the Directory of Obsolete Securities. For securities that
exited Barron’s due to mergers, name changes, liquidations, or bankruptcies, we used the National
Stock Summary and the Directory of Obsolete Securities to generate “delisting” returns similar to
procedures used by CRSP when a ﬁrm leaves their sample. For ﬁrms that moved to the NYSE or
AMEX, we used CRSP to continue the time series of prices. The forthcoming Data Appendix will
provide further details on how returns were calculated for ﬁrms that disappeared from Barron’s.
An essential component of the analysis is the accurate identiﬁcation of the ﬁrms that disclose
ﬁnancial information through oﬃcial SEC channels. The Directory of Companies Filing Annual
Reports with the SEC Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 reveal the identities of each
company that complies with mandated disclosure requirements. Each company’s ﬁling status was
collected annually and matched to our sample of Barron’s ﬁrms. The US SEC News Digest reveals
when a company ﬁles a new type of information with the SEC for the ﬁrst time. That information
is used in the event study part of our analysis.
We gathered accounting information on the ﬁrms in the Barron’s sample from Moody’s Indus-
trial Manual, Moody’s Public Utility Manual, Moody’s Bank and Financial Manual,a n dMoody’s
Transportation Manual. These manuals were published annually. For most companies, the manu-
als contain fairly detailed income statement and balance sheet data, information on directors and
managers, and other details. Some companies did not disclose this information, however, so there
is a substantial fraction of the ﬁrms for which some or all of this information was not available.
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Our primary OTC sample is comprised of the 1,251 OTC ﬁrms that appeared in the January 7,
1963 issue of Barron’s.24 We form a panel data ﬁle of these companies that runs through the end
of 1966. These ﬁrms are then divided into the aﬀected and unaﬀected groups to form equally
weighted portfolios. We do not add new ﬁrms to the portfolios because our focus is on the eﬀect
of changing the mandated disclosure requirements on an existing set of ﬁrms.25 Here, we provide
some summary statistics on this panel and describe how the ﬁrms are divided into the aﬀected and
unaﬀected groups.
Table 3 details the attrition from the Barron’s sample, starting at the beginning of 1963. The
weekly return for each portfolio is based on the ﬁr m sf o rw h i c hw ew e r ea b l et oa s c e r t a i nap r i c e
that week. In cases where the ﬁrm disappears from Barron’s and we cannot continue the series, it
is assigned a delisting return in the ﬁrst week that a price cannot be located. For all subsequent
weeks, it does not enter the calculation of the portfolio’s return. This is equivalent to assuming that
the missing ﬁrms’ return in the subsequent weeks are equal to the mean return of the remaining
ﬁrms.
The ﬁrst row of the table reports the sample size for the week of 1963, 1964, 1965, and 1966,
as well as the ﬁnal week of the panel (week 52 of 1966). Rows (a) through (f) report the 6 diﬀerent
reasons that ﬁrms leave Barron’s and the numbers that leave for each of these reasons between each
of the dates. For each exit reason, the table presents the number of ﬁrms for which we assigned
a delisting return upon the exit from Barron’s and whether we were able to continue the series.
The largest single source of attrition from the sample is ﬁrms that move to an exchange. Over the
course of four years, roughly 21% of the ﬁrms move to the NYSE or the AMEX. The movement
to exchanges is especially high in 1963 and 1964, slows somewhat in 1965, and slows even more in
1966. This foreshadows our results in that as mandatory disclosure began to look more likely, the
value of staying unlisted declined. The other forms of attrition were smaller and of a roughly equal
number across years.
4.3 Composition of the Aﬀected and Unaﬀected Groups
To conduct the analysis, each of the 1,251 Barron’s OTC ﬁrms was assigned to either the fully
aﬀected, partially aﬀected, unlisted unaﬀected, or listed aﬀected group. Because it is likely that
24We drop listings for B shares and preferred shares to have a uniform set of stocks, along with listings for banks
and insurance companies.
25Another interesting question is whether the 1964 Act changed private ﬁrms’ decisions on where to have its shares
trade upon going public. This is beyond the scope of the current paper.
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their assets or the number of shareholders, an analysis of the ﬁrms that comply with the disclosure
requirements would suﬀer from classic selection bias.26 Consequently, we assign ﬁrms to three
groups based on characteristics in 1962, which predates the event window. This assignment rule
means that the aﬀected group will include ﬁrms that complied with the 1964 Amendments and some
that evaded their requirements. However, our estimated eﬀect of the law is the policy parameter
of interest because it allows for the inevitable eﬀorts to evade the disclosure requirements.
In assigning the Barron’s ﬁrms to the groups we used 1962 information to mimic the statutory
requirements of the 1964 Amendments. This was complicated by the absence of information on the
number of shareholders and/or assets for a number of ﬁrms. The fully aﬀected group is comprised
of ﬁrms that did not ﬁle with the SEC in 1963 and had measured assets in 1962 exceeding $1 million
and more than 500 shareholders or had measured assets exceeding $5 million but no shareholder
data.27 The partially aﬀected group includes ﬁrms that ﬁl e dw i t ht h eS E Ci n1 9 6 3a n dh a d
measured assets in 1962 exceeding $1 million and more than 500 shareholders or had measured
assets exceeding $5 million but no shareholder data. Firms that did not ﬁle in 1963 and fell below
the asset or shareholder ﬂoors (including those with both assets and shareholder data missing) were
assigned to the unlisted unaﬀected group, as were ﬁrms that ﬁled with the SEC in 1963 and fell
below the asset or shareholder ﬂoor or were missing data on both variables.
We created two other unaﬀected groups from the AMEX and NYSE ﬁrms, both of which had
no change in ﬁling status. The ﬁrst is labeled “listed unaﬀected with market capitalization <=
$35 million.” It is comprised of all AMEX and NYSE ﬁrms with market values less than $35
million at the beginning of 1963. This cut-oﬀ was chosen because the median market capitalization
of this group is $9 million, which is the same median market capitalization of the fully aﬀected
group. Thus, this listed unaﬀected group is used as a counterfactual for the fully aﬀected group.
Analogously, the “unlisted unaﬀected with market capitalization <= $45 million” group is chosen
to match the $10 million median market capitalization of the partially aﬀe c t e dg r o u pa n di su s e da s
a counterfactual for this group. These two unaﬀected groups are a small fraction of the overall listed
markets. The “unlisted unaﬀected with market capitalization <= $36 million” group comprised
3.6% of CRSP market capitalization at the beginning of 1963, while the “<= $45 million” group
26Another negative consequence of deﬁning the groups based on post-1964 observed ﬁling status is that this would
induce a mechanical correlation between ﬁling status and returns in the 1963-64 period. This is because ﬁrms with
high returns in 1963-4 will have to ﬁle simply because their high returns are likely to push them above the asset and
shareholder thresholds.
27There are no cases where shareholder information is available but assets are not available. Results are not
sensitive to changing the asset cutoﬀ used for ﬁrms with no shareholder information.
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4.4 Attrition and Filing Status by Groups
Panel A of Table 4 displays the sample sizes of each of the ﬁve groups (there are two listed unaﬀected
groups, one to match each aﬀected group) of ﬁrms at the start of our analysis, as well as showing
the attrition from each group over the analyzed period. The fully aﬀected group has 228 ﬁrms in
the beginning of 1963. This group is considerably smaller than the partially aﬀected group because
many ﬁrms that were trading in the OTC market as of 1963 had raised equity in the previous
twenty-seven years. Sample attrition is similar among these two groups, with approximately 80%
of each group still trading as a stand-alone ﬁrm at the end of 1966. Sample attrition is much higher
in the unaﬀected OTC group.
Panel B of Table 4 shows the annual SEC ﬁling status of ﬁrms in the initial Barron’s sample.
It is evident that the law aﬀected the ﬁling status of the fully aﬀected group. In particular, the
proportion of these ﬁrms that ﬁled in 1963 increased from 0% to 76.8% in 1966. Because our
assignment rule is based on 1962 information and actual ﬁling status is based on 1964 information,
it is to be expected that some of our aﬀected groups do not ﬁle after the Amendments become
law and that some ﬁrms in the unaﬀected group do ﬁle. The table demonstrates that this is in
fact the case. However, there is a sharp diﬀerence between the proportion of “fully aﬀected” ﬁrms
that actually ﬁle by 1966 (76.8%) and that portion of the “unlisted unaﬀected” ﬁrms that did not
ﬁle before the law (32.0%.) It is evident that our classiﬁc a t i o n si n t ot h e s et w og r o u p si sh i g h l y
correlated with eventual disclosure status.
4.5 1962 Characteristics of Groups.
Table 5 reports the means of a number of important variables at the end of 1962, by group. It also
reports the number of ﬁrms with nonmissing observations for each variable by group. The ﬁrst
panel reports the mean and median stock market capitalization and mean share price for each of
the groups. The entries suggest that the market capitalization of the fully aﬀected and partially
aﬀected groups is roughly an order of magnitude greater than the market cap for the unaﬀected
group. The reliability of this ﬁnding is limited by the small number of ﬁrms with nonmissing market
capitalization data in the unaﬀected groups. However, it has been noted elsewhere that the price
per share is correlated with market capitalization and if this holds true here then the aﬀected ﬁrms
are indeed larger.
The rest of the table reports on a series of ﬁrm-level variables also collected from Moody’s an-
nual handbooks. Many of these variables are missing for a substantial fraction of OTC ﬁrms. This
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relatively basic information about these companies before the 1964 Amendments. Further, it un-
derscores that this legislation was likely to substantially increase the level of information available
about these ﬁrms. As with the market capitalization variable, the aﬀected ﬁrms are much larger
than the unaﬀected ﬁrms by all measures.
5 Empirical Methodology
Our analysis compares the returns to shareholders of ﬁrms aﬀected and unaﬀected by the 1964
Amendments’ disclosure requirements. Here, we discuss the econometric models used to estimate
whether abnormal excess returns accrued to shareholders of aﬀected ﬁrms.
We begin by constructing a time series of the equal weighted portfolio returns for each of our









i=1(Pigt − Pigt−1 + Digt)/Pigt−1 (1)
where Rgt is the return for holding the group g portfolio from the end of week t − 1 to the end
of week t. The return for each ﬁrm in the portfolio, Rigt,i sc a l c u l a t e da st h ec h a n g ei nt h ep r i c e
per share at the ends of week t and t − 1 (i.e., Pigt − Pigt−1) plus any dividends paid between the
price observations (i.e., Digt) all divided by the price at the end of week t− 1. N is the number of
ﬁrms in each group in that week. Because the market capitalization for a number of the ﬁrms in
t h es a m p l ei sm i s s i n g ,w ec a n n o tc a l c u l a t et h ev a l u ew e i g h t e dr e t u r n .
It is standard to model the returns of any of the groups using a four factor model of the form:
Rgt−Rft = αg+β1g (Rmt − Rft)+β2gSMBt+β3gHMLt+β4gMOMt+εgt, εgt = λt+νgt (2)
where Rft is the return on a risk-free asset, which is measured as the Treasury bill rate. This
equation controls for the diﬀerence between market and risk-free returns, two factors based on
Fama and French (1993), and a momentum factor based on Carhart (1997). The market return
is measured as the value weighted CRSP return that uses both NYSE and AMEX ﬁrms. The
three factors are measured as the diﬀerence in the returns of portfolios of small and large stocks
(SMB), the diﬀerence in returns of portfolios of value and growth stocks (HML), and the diﬀerence
in returns of portfolios of stocks with high and low returns over the period from two to twelve
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so the absence of market capitalization and accounting data for all the OTC ﬁr m sd o e sn o tp o s e
a problem for estimation.29 The g subscript on the parameters underscores that this equation can
be estimated separately for each of our groups and that the eﬀect of the factors can vary across
groups. εgt is the unobserved determinant of group g’ sr e t u r na n di sc o m p o s e do fat i m e - s p e c i ﬁc
factor (i.e., λt) and an idiosyncratic factor (i.e., νgt).
In this setting, αg measures the abnormal excess returns, speciﬁc to group g. The appeal of this
measure of abnormal returns is that it has been purged of any covariance with the overall market and
with the three factors. This is important in our context because our groups may have high or low
returns in the examined period simply because of their riskiness relative to the market or because
they are disproportionately comprised of small, value, and/or high momentum ﬁrms. In general, it
is rare to ﬁnd instances where groups of stocks or portfolios have statistically signiﬁcant abnormal
excess returns based on the above model and it this provides a useful performance benchmark.
An important limitation of equation (2) is that it is impossible to separately identify αg and
λt, so the estimated αg may measure the g’s abnormal excess return and time varying factors that
are common to multiple groups. For instance, suppose there was a positive shock to the returns of
all OTC ﬁrms during one of the periods we study. Then the estimated αfa, where “fa”i n d i c a t e s
fully aﬀected, would capture the eﬀect of the 1964 Amendments and the shock. In this case, it
would be invalid to interpret the estimated αfa as a causal estimate of the abnormal excess returns
for the fully aﬀected group. Because of these limitations, we present our estimates of Equation (2)
in Appendix Table 1. We focus our discussion and our primary tables on analyses that control for
time shocks across portfolios.
In light of this possibility, a compelling feature of our research design is that the unaﬀected
groups can be used to purge the estimated αg’s of these common time factors. This is accomplished
by diﬀerencing equation (2) for an aﬀected and unaﬀected groups. An example of special interest
is the diﬀerence between the fully aﬀected group and the unlisted unaﬀected (“uu”) group, which
becomes:
28K e n n e t hF r e n c hg e n e r o u s l yp r o v i d e du sw i t ht h eS M Ba n dH M Ld a i l ys e r i e sa n de x t e n d e d
them back an extra year so we can perform analysis through all of 1963. Using daily re-
turn data, we calculated the weekly momentum series based on the formulas on French’s web page
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.)
29Another advantage of using SMB, HML, and MOM series calculated with NYSE and AMEX data is that all of
these ﬁrms are listed and unaﬀected. So, these portfolios do not reﬂect the eﬀect of the 1964 Amendments.
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+(β3,fa − β3,uu)HMLt +( β4,fa − β4,uu)MOMt +( νfa,t− νuu,t) (3)
Note that λt has been diﬀerenced out of equation (3), so time varying factors common to the two
groups cannot bias the estimated parameters. The estimated β’s are the diﬀerence in the loadings
between the fully aﬀected and unlisted unaﬀected groups. The parameter of interest is αfa−αuu,
which is interpreted as the diﬀerence in the abnormal excess returns between the fully aﬀected
a n du n l i s t e du n a ﬀected groups. The null hypothesis is that this diﬀerence is equal to zero. An
important feature of our research design is that it divides the 1963-1966 period into three periods.
We ﬁt equation (3) separately in each of these periods.
A few other features of our approach merit highlighting. First, we exploit the availability of
the two unaﬀected groups (listed/unlisted) to present two diﬀerent estimates of the eﬀect of the
l a wo ne a c ho ft h ea ﬀected groups. It is not evident which of these groups is the more appropriate
control group, so the presentation of both estimates allows for an examination of the sensitivity of
the results to alternative choices.
Second, to the extent that there are diﬀerences in the industry composition of the aﬀected and
unaﬀected groups, the estimated abnormal excess return from the ﬁtting of equation (3) may be
biased by industry-speciﬁc shocks that are unrelated to the law. To probe this possibility, we also
present results where the weekly returns for the unaﬀected groups are calculated with the industry
weights of the relevant aﬀe c t e dg r o u p s .T h i r d ,t h ee s t i m a t i o no fe q u a t i o n( 3 )w i t hg r o u pb yw e e k
data, rather than ﬁrm by week data, is a conservative solution to the likely correlation in unobserved
returns across ﬁrms within the same week.
Fourth, our primary estimates are average abnormal excess returns so they are equivalent to a
portfolio that is rebalanced every week to ensure an equal weighting across all ﬁrms in the portfolio.
The shortcoming of this approach is that it does not mimic the buy and hold strategy that many
investors employ. Its advantages are that it is possible to control for the factors without accounting
information on OTC ﬁrms and that normality assumptions are closer to being valid for average
abnormal excess returns than for buy and hold returns (see Fama (1998)). Nevertheless, we also
present results when the weights on a given stock are allowed to evolve based on its returns since
the construction of the group or portfolio.
Fifth, equation (3) relies on estimated β’s that are obtained from data during each of the three
periods. This is a valid approach if the law does not aﬀect the β’s. It would be inappropriate,
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would be using endogenously determined β’s to estimate the abnormal excess return. In the next
draft we plan to also report results from Periods 1 and 2 when the β’s are estimated from Period 3
and to calculate policy eﬀects under diﬀerent assumptions about whether the changes in β’s is or
is not due to the 1964 Amendments.
6R e s u l t s
6.1 Unadjusted Returns
We begin with a graphical analysis of the unadjusted returns by group. Figure 1 depicts the
unadjusted cumulative returns for the fully aﬀected group, the unlisted unaﬀected group, and the
matched listed unaﬀected group. Thus, each data point represents the current week’s return for
each group added to the sum of the return in all previous weeks. The vertical lines denote divisions
b e t w e e ne a c ho ft h et h r e ep e r i o d s .D u r i n gp e r i o d1 ,t h ef u l l ya ﬀe c t e da n dl i s t e du n a ﬀected groups
each had cumulative returns of approximately 20% (a bit lower for the listed unaﬀected group). In
contrast, the cumulative return was approximately negative ﬁve percent for the unlisted unaﬀected
group. The ﬁgure also shows that unadjusted returns are more similar for each of these three groups
in periods 2 and 3.
Figure 2 performs a similar analysis for the partially aﬀected group. The ﬁgure shows that the
partially aﬀected group outperformed the unlisted unaﬀected group during period 1, but that the
partially aﬀected and unlisted unaﬀected groups had comparable returns. The results for periods
2a n d3a r ea l s os i m i l a rt ot h o s ei nF i g u r e1 . S p e c i ﬁcally, the three groups seem to follow more
similar patterns in their returns throughout 1965 and 1966.
Overall, these ﬁgures provide an initial examination of the eﬀects of the 1964 Amendments. In
period 1, the plots imply that the passage of the 1964 Amendments led to higher returns when the
aﬀected groups are compared to the unlisted unaﬀected group, but there is only small eﬀects when
the comparisons are to the matched listed unaﬀected groups. The next subsection will explore
the robustness of these preliminary ﬁndings to adjustment for the standard determinants of stock
returns. Notably, the excess returns of aﬀected ﬁrms relative to those of listed unaﬀected ﬁrms
become larger once we control for the four factors.
6.2 Abnormal Excess Returns
We now turn to estimates of the adjusted, or abnormal excess returns for each of the three periods.
Table 6A presents the results from testing for abnormal excess returns for the fully aﬀected group.
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groups, respectively. In the third panel, the dependent variable is the diﬀerence between the returns
of the fully aﬀected and partially aﬀected groups. In principle, the results in this last panel identify
the separate eﬀect of the registration and periodic reporting requirements, while the ﬁrst two
panels identify the eﬀect of all four disclosure requirements. For this interpretation to be valid, it
is necessary to assume that the eﬀect of these two forms of disclosure are additive and separable.
Each column reports the abnormal excess return (i.e., the parameter on the constant) from
the estimation of alternative versions of equation (3). The speciﬁcation details are reported in the
bottom rows of the table. In the ﬁrst column, the only adjustment is for the overall market return.
The second column adds the three other factors to the speciﬁcation. In the third column, we account
for the diﬀerences in the industry composition of the aﬀected and unaﬀected groups by recalculating
the unaﬀected group returns with the week-speciﬁc industry weights of the fully aﬀected group.
In the ﬁrst three columns, we have implicitly assumed that investors in our constructed portfolios,
or groups, rebalance the equal-weighted portfolios every week. Since it is unlikely that investors
would follow such an investment strategy, the fourth column reports results from a “buy and hold”
strategy. Speciﬁcally, we start by putting an equal dollar value in each stock of the portfolio. In
calculating the portfolio return from date t to t +1 , we assume that the share invested in stock i
equals (value of investment in stock i at t)/(total value of portfolio at t) where the investors is now
assumed to make no trades between the initial portfolio formation and date t.
The ﬁr s tt w op a n e l ss u g g e s tt h a tt h ef u l l ya ﬀected group had signiﬁcant abnormal excess returns
in Period 1. When the listed unaﬀected group is used to diﬀerence out the time eﬀect, the estimated
abnormal excess weekly return is similar across all four speciﬁcations and ranges from 0.17% to
0.22%. Notably, all of these estimates would be judged to be statistically signiﬁcant by conventional
criteria. Because there are 85 weeks in this period, these estimates indicate that by the end of
the period the fully aﬀected group’s cumulative abnormal excess return was approximately 14-
18%. In the second panel, where the unlisted unaﬀected group is the comparison group, the
cumulative abnormal excess return ranges from 21% to 26%. The similarity of the estimates across
speciﬁcations and between the two unaﬀected groups is reassuring. In the context of the Shleifer-
Wolfenzon model, these results suggest that shareholders expect the present discounted value of
future dividends to increase by 14-26% due to reduced insider diversion of proﬁts or lack of eﬀort.
In the third panel, the point estimates range from 0.08% to 0.15% and are generally marginally
signiﬁcant when judged by conventional criteria. Under the additive separability assumption, the
ﬁndings suggest that the registration and periodic reporting requirements are responsible for a
cumulative abnormal excess return of 7% to 13% during period 1.
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is generally associated with the four factor model. There are two explanation for this poor ﬁt.
First, the regression is for excess returns rather than returns. Second, there is a weaker covariance
between the returns of OTC ﬁrms and the standard four factors.30
Panel B of Table 6 repeats this analysis for the partially aﬀected group. These results provide
direct evidence on the eﬀect of compliance with the proxy and insider trading types of mandated
disclosure. All of the estimates of α are positive. They range between 0.080% and 0.23% and 3
of 8 would be judged statistically signiﬁcant by conventional criteria. The estimates are smaller
when the listed unaﬀected group is used for comparison. Overall, these estimates indicate that the
1964 Amendments are associated with a cumulative abnormal excess return of 7% to 20% for the
partially aﬀected group in period 1.
Table 7 is identical to Table 6, except that it reports the estimated α’s from ﬁtting equation
(2) in period 3. Recall, period 3 is after the law has passed and the vast majority of new ﬁlers have
registered with the SEC. Thus, there is no new information about the law or about who will comply
with its requirements. Consequently, we expect that the groups, which were constructed based on
whether they would be required to comply with the law, should not predict returns. Speciﬁcally, we
expect that neither of our aﬀected groups will have abnormal excess returns in this period. If this
null hypothesis is rejected by the data, it raises the possibility that our research design is invalid,
which would undermine the credibility of the results from period 1.
The entries in panels A and B of Table 7 provide little evidence of abnormal excess returns.
Across the diﬀerent combinations of aﬀected and unaﬀected groups and speciﬁcations, the point
estimates are almost all small in magnitude. Further, none of them are statistically signiﬁcant
by standard criteria. Overall, the ﬁndings from this sixty week period support the validity of our
research design and lend credibility to the hypothesis that the estimated eﬀects in period 1 are due
to the 1964 Amendments.
Panels A and B of Table 8 repeat the same analysis for period 2. Here, the fully aﬀected group
has positive abnormal excess returns that would generally be judged statistically signiﬁcant. The
magnitude of the fully aﬀected group’s excess abnormal returns is similar to its performance in
period 1, though the fact that period 3 is shorter than period 1 (62 weeks instead of 85 weeks)
means that the cumulative abnormal excess return is smaller, 7-16%. The estimates for the partially
30Appendix Table 1 reports the results from the separate estimation of equation (2) for each group. The R-squared
statistics in Period 1 range between 0.15 and 0.46 for the OTC groups and 0.89 to 0.91 for the listed groups. As
expected, the listed groups’ returns have a higher covariance with the overall market. The estimated constants from
these regressions provide an opportunity to better understand the source of the results in Table 6. The second and
third columns report the period 2 and 3 results.
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is statistically signiﬁcant. These ﬁndings for the partially aﬀected group are consistent with the
possibility that it was easier for the market to form correct expectations about whether these ﬁrms
would comply with the law because they were already ﬁling with the SEC and on average were
further above the asset and shareholder cutoﬀs for compliance.
As we discussed above, the interpretation of these results depends on one’s beliefs about whether
the market had the correct expectations about the information that was revealed in this period.
Under the assumption that the market had formed the correct expectations about the enforcement
of the Amendments, the fraction of ﬁrms that would register with the SEC, and the revealed
ﬁnancial position of ﬁlers, then the ﬁnding of positive abnormal excess returns invalidates our
research design and the standard four factor model in this setting. Alternatively, if markets updated
their beliefs about any of the above during period 2, then these abnormal excess returns can be
interpreted as a consequence of the law and the period 1 eﬀects underestimate the law’s total impact.
The ﬁnding of zero abnormal excess returns in period 3 supports this possibility. Furthermore, the
event study of the exact ﬁrst ﬁling dates below suggests that resolution of compliance uncertainty
is indeed important, especially so for the fully aﬀected group.
Ultimately, we do not think the period 2 results invalidate the period 1 ﬁndings. But we are
also uncomfortable assigning the period 2 eﬀects to the law. Because the underlying assumptions
are inherently untestable, we recognize that others may reach alternative conclusions about period
2.
Figures 3 and 4 summarize the abnormal excess returns graphically. First, consider Figure 3
which plots the cumulative abnormal excess returns for the fully aﬀected group across all three
periods. The data points to the left of the ﬁrst vertical line are obtained from the period 1
regressions that were reported in column (2) of Table 6A. Recall, this speciﬁcation adjusts for all
four factors. We measure the abnormal excess return in each week as the sum of the estimated α
and the residual. These abnormal excess returns are then summed cumulatively and plotted. Thus,
the value at the ﬁrst vertical line is equal to the cumulative abnormal excess return in period 1.
The period 2 and 3 regression results from Tables 8A and 7A are used to extend the line between
the two vertical lines and to the right of the second vertical line, respectively. Figure 4 plots the
cumulative abnormal excess returns for the partially aﬀected group and is produced identically.
The ﬁgures show that the period 1 abnormal excess returns for the aﬀected groups occur
throughout that period. This is consistent with our impression that the probability of the pas-
sage of the legislation increased consistently throughout the event window. In other words, these
graphs do not reveal a sharp increase (or decrease) in abnormal returns consistent with an un-
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would be extended to the fully and partially aﬀected groups. The period 2 abnormal excess returns
occur throughout that period. Finally, there is little evidence of abnormal excess returns in any
s u b p e r i o do fp e r i o d3 .
7 Event Study Evidence on the Consequences of Registration
In this section, we present an event study of the consequences of complying with the disclosure
requirements of the 1964 Amendments soon after its passage. In the ﬁrst subsection, we examine
the eﬀect on returns. The second subsection explores the eﬀect on bid-ask spreads, which we
interpret as a measure of liquidity. These results provide further evidence that the market placed
a value on the information ﬁrms were mandated to disclose as a result of the 1964 law.
7.1 Price Eﬀects of Registration
Here, we test whether the market rewarded ﬁrms that registered with the SEC in the period
immediately surrounding the SEC’s receipt of their registration materials. To implement this
analysis, we obtained the exact date that the SEC received registration materials from new ﬁlers
from all issues of the SEC News Digest from 1965 and 1966. We combined this information with
the stock returns data from periods 2 and 3.
These data were used to implement an event study of the eﬀects of registration with the SEC.
Speciﬁcally, we estimate ﬁrm-level equations for ﬁrm’s weekly return minus the riskless rate on
as a m p l eo fa l lﬁrms that registered in this period. The sample includes all ﬁlers, regardless of
whether they are assigned to one of our aﬀected or unaﬀected groups in the prior analysis. These
equations include separate intercepts for period 2 and 3 and control for the overall market return
and the three other factors. The eﬀects of the four factors are allowed to vary across the aﬀected and
unaﬀected groups (as we have classiﬁed them based on the 1962 information) but are constrained
to be equal across the periods within group. We ﬁt this model and then calculate the estimated
residuals for each of the 30 weeks prior to the registration week and the 30 weeks subsequent to it.
These residuals are considered the average abnormal return in a week, where the precise week is
denoted by its distance from the registration date. Figure 5 plots the cumulative average abnormal
returns against the week, again denoted by its distance from the registration date, for ﬁrms that
ﬁled on or before their due date. This is done separately for ﬁrms that had never previously ﬁled
with the SEC (i.e., ﬁrms assigned to the “0-0” subgroup of the unlisted unaﬀected group and
ﬁrms in the fully aﬀected group) and ﬁrms that were already complying with the periodic reporting
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the partially aﬀected group) but began to comply with the proxy and insider trading requirements
for the ﬁrst time in this period. The vertical lines are placed at 10 weeks before and after the
registration week.
For the “0-0” subgroup and fully aﬀected ﬁrms, there is a large increase in returns in the
5 weeks preceding the week of registration. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁlers in this group had cumulative
abnormal returns of approximately 8.2% in the 10 weeks preceding registration. This is economically
meaningful and statistically signiﬁcant. There is little evidence of positive or negative abnormal
returns in the weeks prior or subsequent to this 10 week period.
There are at least two reasons that it is not surprising that this eﬀe c ti se v i d e n ti na d v a n c e
of the recorded registration date. First, ﬁrms may have announced the impending ﬁling prior to
sending it to the SEC. Second, we found evidence that there were modest delays between the SEC’s
receipt of the registration materials and the announcement in the SEC News Digest.
In the case of the “2-2” subgroup and partially aﬀected ﬁrms, cumulative abnormal returns
increase in the 10 weeks preceding the registration week, but this increase appears to be part of a
trend throughout the entire sixty week period. Consequently, we suspect that the increase in returns
in the 10 week window is not related to the act of registration. The revelation that these ﬁrms
would comply with the proxy and insider requirements may not have been very surprising because
they were already ﬁling quarterly and annual accounting reports with the SEC. Consequently, it
seems reasonable to suppose that these registrations did not surprise the market.
Figure 6 displays the analogous results from an examination of the eﬀect of registration for
ﬁrms that register after the date that they are required to do so based on their ﬁscal year end
date. Here, the results are based on all OTC ﬁrms as a group. The line is ﬂat throughout the
entire period, indicating that there is no evidence of abnormal excess returns in any subperiod of
the sixty weeks. We found evidence that ﬁrms were frequently granted extensions by the SEC that
allowed them to ﬁle after their required registration date. Thus, it is possible that these ﬁrms had
previously communicated their plans to ﬁle to market participants in a credible manner. In this
case, the failure to ﬁnd abnormal returns in the period immediately preceding the registration week
is not surprising.
We plan to probe the robustness of these results in a number of ways. First, we plan to do an
event study for ﬁrms that failed to ﬁle, around the potential due date for ﬁling. This date can be
determined from their ﬁscal year ends. As long as the market placed a positive probability on these
ﬁrms’ ﬁling, we expect that the failure to ﬁl ew o u l dl e a dt oad e c l i n ei nt h e s eﬁrms’ stock prices.
Second, we will estimate richer econometric models that include week ﬁxed eﬀects and allow for
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7.2 Registrations’ Eﬀect on Bid-Ask Spreads
Our focus to this point has been on price eﬀects of the 1964 Amendments and the subsequent
information disclosures that the Act generated. One way that disclosure can aﬀect stock prices is
by making a stock more liquid, so we now consider to what extent this was part of the eﬀect of the
law. We look at the eﬀect of disclosures on bid/ask spreads. To do this, we essentially run another
event study, though creating an appropriate counterfactual is much simpler in this context. We
run regressions of the form
Sit = αi + δt + rit + cit + εit (4)
where Sit is the bid/ask spread of ﬁrm i in week t (deﬁned as the Barron’s ask minus the bid
divided by the average of the bid and ask), α is a ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect, δ is a week ﬁxed eﬀect, rit is
an indicator that takes the value one if ﬁrm i has ﬁled a registration statement with the SEC as of
week t,a n dcit is an indicator that takes the value one if the ﬁrm has not registered with the SEC
a n di fw e e kt is past the due date for SEC registration based on the ﬁrm’s ﬁscal year end and the
SEC registration rules. The two variables of particular interest are rit, which indicates that a ﬁrm
has disclosed the signiﬁcant amount of information in the registration statement and committed to
future disclosures of the three other forms, and cit, which indicates that the ﬁrm has revealed that
has not registered with the SEC by the stated deadline.
Barron’s changed the way it calculated bid and ask prices early in 1965 for the ﬁrms in its
primary OTC table. Because it did not make this change to its supplemental OTC table and
because the unlisted unaﬀected ﬁrms are more likely to be on the supplemental list, this analysis
could lead to ﬁnding a mechanical relationship between ﬁling status and changes in bid/ask spreads
during 1965. We deal with this problem by, in some cases, restricting our analysis to ﬁrms on the
supplemental list or to weeks after the change in Barron’s and by including separate week ﬁxed
eﬀects for the primary and supplemental OTC tables in all speciﬁcations. Also, if the equilibrium
price to brokers for making a market is similar regardless of share price (for example, if the costs
of making trades are constant on a per share basis), then we would expect higher priced stocks to
have smaller bid/ask spreads. We therefore control for stock price in some speciﬁcations (though
this never aﬀects our conclusions.)
Table 9 contains our results. In Panel A, we perform the bid/ask analysis for the fully aﬀected
group and then for the partially aﬀected group. We limit the sample to ﬁrms that register at some
point, so we are not measuring cit. There is no reason to limit the sample to these aﬀected groups,
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the other groups will actually register and some in the aﬀected group will not. Therefore, in the
top portion of Panel B, we look at all OTC ﬁrms that register with the SEC. In the bottom panel,
we look at all OTC ﬁrms, whether they register or not, which allows us to measure cit.31
The table shows that there appears to be a small association between registration and the
reduction of bid/ask spreads. In every speciﬁcation, the post-registration coeﬃcient is negative.
Most of these coeﬃcients are not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. The estimates using
the largest sample vary from marginally signiﬁcant to signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Depending on
the exact speciﬁcation, the reduction varies from about 0.1% to about 0.5%. Given a mean bid/ask
spread of just over 8%, these point estimates suggest a small but meaningful eﬀect.
Figure 7 displays the exact timing of the change in bid/ask spreads in the weeks immediately
leading up to and following initial SEC registration. The graph is based on a regression very similar
to the one reported in column (2) of the top part of Figure 9, Panel A. We now include indicators
for each of twenty weeks before and after initial registration. The graph displays the coeﬃcients on
each of these indicator variables, with any week more than twenty-one weeks prior to registration
as the excluded variable. As the graph shows, the estimates of any given weekly coeﬃcient is quite
noisy. However, there is a distinct drop down in spreads at the time of the ﬁrst registration. Similar
graphs on other samples show a similar break at the time of registration. The graph shows that
there is a drop of approximately 0.5% in the bid/ask spread and that this drop is typically exactly
at the time of the ﬁrm’s registration. One interpretation of these ﬁndings is that the likely reduction
of insider trading due to the 1964 Amendments had an immediate eﬀect on liquidity.
8C o n c l u s i o n
We studied the last major change in mandatory disclosure in American ﬁnancial markets — the
Securities Acts Amendments of 1964. The Act imposed new disclosure standards on some OTC
ﬁrms. The Act did not aﬀect the disclosure requirements of ﬁrms listed on exchanges because they
were already quite strict and it also did not aﬀect small OTC ﬁrms. Therefore, we used the Act to
compare the eﬀects of disclosure changes on a group of aﬀected ﬁrms while using various groups of
unaﬀected ﬁrms to create a counterfactual.
We found that ﬁrms in the most aﬀected group (that is, those ﬁrms that the Act forced to
make periodic ﬁnancial disclosures, to release proxy information before shareholder meetings, and
31We had to drop ﬁrms that moved to an exchange before registering, however, because bid/ask spreads are not
available for these ﬁrms.
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about 20% from the time of the ﬁrst serious calls for changes in disclosure rules through the time
the Act passed. During this same period, those ﬁrms that were aﬀected by the imposition of proxy
and insider mandates had a cumulative abnormal excess return of approximately 10%.
Our interpretation of these results is that shareholders expected dividends to increase by up to
20% due to reduced insider diversion of resources or increased insider eﬀort after the 1964 Securities
Acts Amendments. These estimates might seem quite high in that it is hard to imagine insiders were
diverting (or not creating by lack of eﬀect) one-ﬁfth of ﬁrm resources before disclosure. However,
other studies have found large eﬀects of “improved behavior by insiders”. For example, takeover
premia are typically substantial and the beneﬁts of trading on inside information has been shown
to be quite large (see, for example Seyhun (1986) and Meulbroek and Hart (1997)).
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Key Dates Associated with the Securities Acts Amendment of 1964
1. November 8, 1960: John F. Kennedy elected President.
2. September 1, 1961: Congress appropriated $750,000 to the SEC to conduct a study of secu-
rities markets.
3. November 28, 1961: Chairman Cary said the SEC would advocate new powers for the agency
including subjecting OTC securities to the same rules as applied to those listed on exchanges.
4. April 3, 1963: The SEC released the ﬁrst part of the Special Study. It recommended imposing
exchange disclosure rules on OTC securities.
5. July 9, 1963: A Senate subcommittee unanimously approved a bill extending disclosure rules
to OTC ﬁrms.
6. July 17, 1963: The SEC released second part of Special Study, which recommended major
overhaul of OTC market. The Wall Street Journal gave the study signiﬁcant coverage and
argued that the proposals in the report were dramatic.
7. July 30, 1963: The Senate passed the bill extending disclosure rules to OTC ﬁrms.
8. February 6, 1964: President Johnson focused on the SEC’s proposed legislation in a “Special
Message.”
9. March 19, 1964: A House subcommittee passed the bill. But, it appeared banks and insurance
companies would not be as aﬀected as other ﬁrms in Group 0-4.
10. May 7, 1964: A House committee passed the bill.
11. August 5-6, 1964: The full House and Senate passed the bill.
12. April 30, 1965: Deadline for ﬁling a registration statement with SEC for newly covered ﬁrms
with at least $1 million of assets and 750 shareholders if they had a ﬁscal year end between
July 1 and December 31 of 1964. (Deadline was 120 days after ﬁscal year end for ﬁrms with
a ﬁscal year ending between January 1, 1965 and June 30, 1965 and it was 120 days after
ﬁrst ﬁscal year end after July 1, 1966 for ﬁrms with at least $1 million of assets and 500
shareholders.)
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Eﬀects of Securities Acts Amendment of 1964 on Various Types of Securities
Type of Disclosure Registration Periodic Reporting Proxy Insider Trades
Period1 Pre Post Pre Post2 Pre Post Pre Post
Fully Aﬀected Group No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Partially Aﬀected Group Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Unlisted Unaﬀected Group Varied Unchanged Varied Unchanged No No No No
Listed Unaﬀected Group Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
“Fully Aﬀected Group” = Unlisted securities issued before 1936 with at least 500 shareholders
and at least $1million in ﬁrm assets
“Partially Aﬀected Group” = Unlisted securities issued (original or secondary) after 1936
“Unlisted Unaﬀected Group” = Unlisted securities with fewer than 500 shareholders and/or
less than $1million in ﬁrm assets
“Listed Unaﬀected Group” = Securities listed on major exchanges
1 “Pre” refers to before the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964 and “Post” refers to after the
law.
2 If the number of shareholders for any given class of securities falls below 300 as of the end of
a ﬁscal year, the reporting requirement is suspended for the subsequent ﬁscal year.
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OTC Sample Firm Counts, 1963-1966
Jan 63 Jan 64 Jan 65 Jan 66 Dec 66
Sample size 1251 1127 1050 980 943
(a) Move to NYSE/AMEX 85 80 62 38
Assigned DR (continued/not cont.) 85 (85/0) 80 (80/0) 62 (62/0) 38 (38/0)
Not assigned DR (continued/not cont.) 0 (0/0) 0 (0/0) 0 (0/0) 0 (0/0)
(b) Name changes 13 14 13 10
Assigned DR (continued/not cont.) 8 (8/0) 10 (8/2) 11 (6/5) 7 (7/0)
Not assigned DR (continued/not cont.) 5 (2/3) 4 (0/4) 2 (0/2) 3 (0/3)
(c) Mergers 24 25 31 21
Assigned DR (continued/not cont.) 17 (12/5) 19 (18/1) 24 (14/10) 17 (9/8)
Not assigned DR (continued/not cont.) 7 (2/5) 6 (5/1) 7 (3/4) 4 (1/3)
(d) Liquidations 11 10 4 8
Assigned DR (continued/not cont.) 11 (0/11) 10 (0/10) 4 (0/4) 7 (0/7)
Not assigned DR (continued/not cont.) 0 (0/0) 0 (0/0) 0 (0/0) 1 (0/1)
(e) Exit from Barrons, last price> $2 37 19 14 15
Assigned DR (continued/not cont.) 32 (0/32) 14 (0/14) 14 (0/14) 11 (0/11)
Not assigned DR (continued/not cont.) 5 (0/5) 5 (0/5) 0 (0/0) 4 (0/4)
(f) Exit from Barrons, last price≤ $2 66 25 15 15
Assigned DR (continued/not cont.) 61 (0/61) 22 (0/22) 15 (0/15) 13 (0/13)
Not assigned DR (continued/not cont.) 5 (0/5) 3 (0/3) 0 (0/0) 3 (0/3)
(g) Discont. due to gap into next calendar year 8 102
Assigned DR (continued/not cont.) 6 (0/6) 0 (0/0) 0 (0/0) 0 (0/0)
Not assigned DR (continued/not cont.) 2 (0/2) 1 (0/1) 0 (0/0) 0 (0/2)
Total exits/changes 244 174 139 109
Total series continued 109 111 85 55
Note: “DR” = delisting return. The number of observations at the beginning of the following year does
not exactly equal the number of observations at the beginning of the current year, minus the number of
exits/changes, plus the number of series that are continued. Further details are available on request.
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OTC Sample Firm Counts By Groups Deﬁned Based on 1963 Filing Status and Size, 1963-1966
Panel A. Sample sizes
Group Number of ﬁrms % in sample
63 64 65 66 66 at end of 1966
week 1 week 1 week 1 week 1 week 52
Fully Aﬀected 228 209 193 183 177 77.6
Partially Aﬀected 740 698 667 623 606 81.9
Unlisted Unaﬀected 283 220 190 174 160 56.5
Listed Unaﬀected with
mkt. cap. <=$35M (CRSP) 1106 1028 985 925 883 79.8
Listed Unaﬀected with
mkt. cap.<=$45M (CRSP) 1219 1134 1087 1023 977 80.1
Note: All OTC and CRSP (NYSE/AMEX) ﬁrms tabulated are present in their respective samples
as of week 1 of 1963. CRSP ﬁrms exclude ﬁrms that enter from the Barrons sample during the
63-66 period. We exclude banks and insurance companies (2-digit SIC codes 60, 61, 63, and 64).
The total number of ﬁrms on CRSP (excluding Barrons entrants) on the ﬁve dates above are 2014,
1943, 1919, 1900, 1889. Firms in the listed unaﬀected group with market capitalization<=$35M
constitute 3.6 percent of CRSP market capitalization in 1963, week 1. Firms in the listed unaﬀected
group with market capitalization<=$45M constitute 4.8 percent of CRSP market capitalization in
week 1 of 1963.
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OTC Sample Firm Counts By Groups Deﬁned Based on 1963 Filing Status and Size, 1963-1966
P a n e lB .P e r c e n to fﬁrms actually ﬁling with the SEC
Percent of ﬁrms present in OTC sample in week 1 of 1963
Group who ﬁle with the SEC as of July of:
63 64 65 66 67
Fully Aﬀected 5.3 (0) 11.0 (4.8) 77.2 (71.9) 76.8 (69.3) 72.8 (65.4)
Partially Aﬀected 100 (100) 98.4 (96.9) 95.0 (91.2) 89.9 (84.6) 81.9 (76.2)
Unlisted Unaﬀected
“0-0” subgroup 4.7 (0) 8.3 (2.4) 27.2 (20.7) 32.0 (25.4) 37.9 (31.4)
“2-2” subgroup 100 (100) 97.4 (94.7) 93.0 (89.5) 90.4 (85.1) 84.2 (79.0)
Percent of ﬁrms in OTC sample in week indicated
Group who ﬁle with the SEC as of the following July
63, week 1 64, week 1 65, week 1 66, week 1 66, week 52
Fully Aﬀected 5.3 (0) 10.3 (4.8) 82.4 (78.2) 82.0 (77.1) 78.5 (72.9)
Partially Aﬀected 100 (100) 98.9 (97.3) 96.7 (93.0) 93.6 (88.6) 85.8 (80.7)
Unlisted Unaﬀected
“0-0” subgroup 4.7 (0) 10.5 (3.2) 36.7 (28.4) 46.5 (37.4) 57.8 (47.8)
“2-2” subgroup 100 (100) 99.0 (95.8) 96.3 (91.4) 97.3 (89.3) 94.3 (85.7)
Note: Numbers in parenthesis exclude ﬁrms that ﬁle because they merged with a ﬁrm that is ﬁling.
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Firm Characteristics by Mandatory Disclosure Groups, 1962
Fully Aﬀected Partially Aﬀected Unlisted Unaﬀected
Sample Mean Sample Mean Sample Mean
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
# Firms 228 — 740 — 283 —
Share Price 228 $19.43 740 $17.04 283 $7.13
Dividends per Share 228 $0.79 740 $0.54 283 $0.11
Market Cap. 217 $59.6 688 $99.2 29 $2.3
Median 217 $24.6 688 $29.9 29 $2.2
# Shareholders 217 2,773 688 4,848 29 491
Assets 228 $28.6 736 $33.3 220 $3.4
Book Value of Assets 155 $13.9 736 $15.5 38 $2.7
Net Income 225 $1.7 730 $1.6 218 $0.1
Sales 190 $33.0 665 $32.6 208 $4.1
Director Names Published 228 97.8% 736 98.9% 221 33.5%
Stock Options Info 228 42.5% 736 61.0% 221 14.9%
Year of Incorporation 227 1928 734 1937 215 1950
All dollar ﬁgures are in millions, except per share data. All ﬁnancial data are for 1962. “Mean” is
the mean of each variable for those observations where the variable is available. All information,
except share price and dividends are from Moody’s publications.
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Average Abnormal Excess Returns
Period 1: January 1963 - August 24, 1964
Panel A: Fully Aﬀected Group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fully Aﬀected Group (“0-4”) - Listed Unaﬀected Group (“4-4”)
αperiod 1 (%) 0.166 0.177 0.177 0.217
(0.076) (0.076) (0.077) (0.073)
R-squared 0.313 0.410 0.377 0.489
Observations 85 85 85 85
Fully Aﬀected Group (“0-4”) - Unlisted Unaﬀected Group (“0-0,2-2”)
αperiod 1 (%) 0.283 0.310 0.251 0.282
(0.093) (0.104) (0.105) (0.093)
R-squared 0.005 0.022 0.030 0.013
Observations 85 85 85 85
Fully Aﬀected Group (“0-4”) - Partially Aﬀected Group (“2-4”)
αperiod 1 (%) 0.089 0.080 0.151 0.091
(0.046) (0.059) (0.068) (0.059)
R-squared 0.098 0.120 0.142 0.154
Observations 85 85 85 85
Factor Model Market only 4 factors 4 factors 4 factors
Industry Matched No No Yes No
Buy and Hold No No No Yes
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Average Abnormal Excess Returns
Period 1: January 1963 - August 24, 1964
P a n e lB :P a r t i a l l yA ﬀected Group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Partially Aﬀected Group (“2—4”) - Listed Unaﬀected Group (“4-4”)
αperiod 1 (%) 0.080 0.105 0.124 0.131
(0.062) (0.069) (0.068) (0.068)
R-squared 0.255 0.341 0.264 0.393
Observations 85 85 85 85
Partially Aﬀected Group (“2—4”) - Unlisted Unaﬀected Group (“0-0,2-2”)
αperiod 1 (%) 0.194 0.230 0.181 0.191
(0.085) (0.096) (0.106) (0.086)
R-squared 0.061 0.081 0.051 0.087
Observations 85 85 85 85
Factor Model Market only 4 factors 4 factors 4 factors
Industry Matched No No Yes No
Buy and Hold No No No Yes
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Average Abnormal Excess Returns
Period 3: November 2, 1965 through end of 1966
Panel A: Fully Aﬀected Group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fully Aﬀected Group (“0-4”) - Listed Unaﬀected Group (“4-4”)
αperiod 3 (%) -0.155 -0.004 -0.011 -0.003
(0.095) (0.080) (0.090) (0.105)
R-squared 0.364 0.680 0.461 0.598
Observations 60 60 60 60
Fully Aﬀected Group (“0-4”) - Unlisted Unaﬀected Group (“0-0,2-2”)
αperiod 3 (%) -0.103 -0.021 -0.047 -0.122
(0.146) (0.132) (0.151) (0.170)
R-squared 0.010 0.173 0.096 0.099
Observations 60 60 60 60
Fully Aﬀected Group (“0-4”) - Partially Aﬀected Group (“2-4”)
αperiod 3 (%) -0.019 -0.011 0.080 -0.002
(0.057) (0.063) (0.068) (0.083)
R-squared 0.009 0.019 0.006 0.006
Observations 60 60 60 60
Factor Model Market only 4 factors 4 factors 4 factors
Industry Matched No No Yes No
Buy and Hold No No No Yes
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Average Abnormal Excess Returns
Period 3: November 2, 1965 through end of 1966
P a n e lB :P a r t i a l l yA ﬀected Group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Partially Aﬀected Group (“2—4”) - Listed Unaﬀected Group (“4-4”)
αperiod 3 (%) -0.133 -0.003 -0.026 -0.003
(0.086) (0.071) (0.069) (0.076)
R-squared 0.376 0.642 0.442 0.705
Observations 60 60 60 60
Partially Aﬀected Group (“2—4”) - Unlisted Unaﬀected Group (“0-0,2-2”)
αperiod 3 (%) -0.084 -0.010 0.052 -0.120
(0.142) (0.129) (0.119) (0.159)
R-squared 0.020 0.158 0.105 0.090
Observations 60 60 60 60
Factor Model Market only 4 factors 4 factors 4 factors
Industry Matched No No Yes No
Buy and Hold No No No Yes
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Average Abnormal Excess Returns
Period 2: August 25, 1964 - November 1, 1965
Panel A: Fully Aﬀected Group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fully Aﬀected Group (“0-4”) - Listed Unaﬀected Group (“4-4”)
αperiod 2 (%) 0.095 0.159 0.161 0.215
(0.081) (0.077) (0.079) (0.082)
R-squared 0.052 0.293 0.222 0.272
Observations 62 62 62 62
Fully Aﬀected Group (“0-4”) - Unlisted Unaﬀected Group (“0-0,2-2”)
αperiod 2 (%) 0.197 0.228 0.262 0.242
(0.088) (0.092) (0.116) (0.127)
R-squared 0.007 0.112 0.103 0.188
Observations 62 62 62 62
Fully Aﬀected Group (“0-4”) - Partially Aﬀected Group (“2-4”)
αperiod 2 (%) 0.109 0.121 0.194 0.148
(0.048) (0.051) (0.053) (0.060)
R-squared 0.007 0.085 0.107 0.074
Observations 62 62 62 62
Factor Model Market only 4 factors 4 factors 4 factors
Industry Matched No No Yes No
Buy and Hold No No No Yes
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Average Abnormal Excess Returns
Period 2: August 25, 1964 - November 1, 1965
P a n e lB :P a r t i a l l yA ﬀected Group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Partially Aﬀected Group (“2—4”) - Listed Unaﬀected Group (“4-4”)
αperiod 2 (%) -0.014 0.038 0.047 0.067
(0.064) (0.055) (0.049) (0.061)
R-squared 0.060 0.237 0.152 0.233
Observations 62 62 62 62
Partially Aﬀected Group (“2—4”) - Unlisted Unaﬀected Group (“0-0,2-2”)
αperiod 2 (%) 0.088 0.107 0.196 0.094
(0.076) (0.083) (0.091) (0.119)
R-squared 0.002 0.046 0.046 0.132
Observations 62 62 62 62
Factor Model Market only 4 factors 4 factors 4 factors
Industry Matched No No Yes No
Buy and Hold No No No Yes
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Mandatory Disclosure Regulation and Bid/Ask Spreads
Panel A: Aﬀected Groups Only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fully Aﬀected Group
Post-registration -0.0045 -0.0061 -0.0057 -0.0026 -0.0015
(0.0047) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0021) (0.0073)
R-squared 0.706 0.715 0.717 0.758 0.630
Observations 25,632 11,531 11,531 11,531 8,235
Partially Aﬀected Group
Post-registration -0.0037 -0.0022 -0.0016 -0.0025 -0.0009
(0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0047)
R-squared 0.741 0.786 0.790 0.831 0.705
Observations 75,107 33,091 33,091 33,091 16,138
1963-1966 Y e sN oN oN oY e s
March ’65 - 1966 only No Yes Yes Yes No
Control for price No No Yes Yes No
Firm-speciﬁc trends No No No Yes No
Supplemental list only No No No No Yes
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Mandatory Disclosure Regulation and Bid/Ask Spreads
P a n e lB :L a r g e rS a m p l e s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All registering ﬁrms
Post-registration -0.0027 -0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0014 -0.0013
(0.0023) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0045)
R-squared 0.729 0.776 0.779 0.824 0.654
Observations 113,059 50,254 50,254 50,254 29,655
All OTC ﬁrms
Post-registration -0.0081 -0.0024 -0.0019 -0.0020 -0.0088
(0.0028) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0057)
Post-expected regist. 0.0028 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0034
(0.0039) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0070)
R-squared 0.734 0.813 0.815 0.850 0.665
Observations 180,214 67,773 67,773 67,773 60,653
1963-1966 Y e sN oN oN oY e s
March ’65 - 1966 only No Yes Yes Yes No
Control for price No No Yes Yes No
Firm-speciﬁc trends No No No Yes No
Supplemental list only No No No No Yes
Notes: All regressions include indicators for each ﬁrm and week indicators (each of which is in-
teracted with an indicator for being on the Barron’s “Supplemental” list). “Post-registration”
indicates that the observation is from after the ﬁrm ﬁles a registration statement with the SEC.
“Post-expected registration” indicates that the ﬁrm did not ﬁle with the SEC by the end of 1966
but, had it ﬁl e d1 8w e e k sa f t e rt h ee n do fi tﬁrst ﬁscal year ending after July 30, 1964, the ob-
servation would have been after such a ﬁling. Robust standard errors allow for correlation across
observations within each ﬁrm.
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Four Factor Estimates by Portfolio by Period — Aﬀected Groups
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Fully Aﬀected Group
α 0.205 (0.088) 0.191 (0.077) 0.018 (0.087)
Market Factor Beta 0.380 (0.139) 0.776 (0.097) 0.806 (0.063)
SMB Factor 0.462 (0.136) 0.522 (0.138) 0.843 (0.140)
HML Factor -0.022 (0.114) 0.222 (0.138) 0.235 (0.063)
Momentum Factor -0.135 (0.170) -0.024 (0.089) -0.185 (0.086)
R-squared 0.302 0.702 0.890
Observations 85 62 60
Partially Aﬀected Group
α 0.124 (0.088) 0.070 (0.056) 0.0029 (0.068)
Market Factor Beta 0.503 (0.124) 0.834 (0.080) 0.826 (0.054)
SMB Factor 0.581 (0.120) 0.669 (0.141) 0.877 (0.095)
HML Factor -0.018 (0.117) 0.281 (0.106) 0.260 (0.066)
Momentum Factor -0.115 (0.152) -0.127 (0.086) -0.183 (0.054)
R-squared 0.456 0.792 0.938
Observations 85 62 60
Notes: Listed unaﬀected group size matched to fully aﬀected (partially aﬀected) group includes
AMEX ﬁrms with market capitalization under $36 million ($63 million) as of January 1, 1963.
“SMB” Factor is Fama-French small minus big factor and “HML” is Fama-French high minus
low factor. See Fama and French (1993) for details. “Momentum Factor” is calculated based on
daily returns so as to be equivalent to the “UMB” factor available monthly from Kenneth French’s
web page (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html). Robust
standard errors in parentheses.
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Four Factor Estimates by Portfolio by Period — Unaﬀected Groups
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Unlisted Unaﬀected Group
α -0.105 (0.141) -0.036 (0.098) 0.018 (0.087)
Market Factor Beta 0.325 (0.168) 0.861 (0.115) 0.806 (0.063)
SMB Factor 0.516 (0.180) 0.853 (0.189) 0.843 (0.140)
HML Factor 0.170 (0.164) 0.257 (0.160) 0.235 (0.063)
Momentum Factor -0.222 (0.213) -0.192 (0.116) -0.185 (0.087)
R-squared 0.148 0.654 0.740
Observations 85 62 60
Listed Unaﬀected Group (size matched to Fully Aﬀected)
α 0.028 (0.045) 0.033 (0.048) 0.061 (0.061)
Market Factor Beta 0.799 (0.039) 0.955 (0.070) 1.000 (0.052)
SMB Factor 0.913 (0.083) 1.023 (0.097) 1.233 (0.098)
HML Factor 0.205 (0.069) 0.629 (0.088) 0.313 (0.068)
Momentum Factor -0.099 (0.068) -0.219 (0.131) -0.122 (0.072)
R-squared 0.889 0.905 0.964
Observations 85 62 60
Listed Unaﬀected Group (size matched to Partially Aﬀected)
α 0.019 (0.042) 0.032 (0.044) 0.062 (0.055)
Market Factor Beta 0.810 (0.037) 0.961 (0.065) 1.004 (0.047)
SMB Factor 0.902 (0.076) 1.015 (0.088) 1.179 (0.086)
HML Factor 0.220 (0.064) 0.522 (0.079) 0.319 (0.062)
Momentum Factor -0.096 (0.063) -0.205 (0.121) -0.106 (0.062)
R-squared 0.906 0.922 0.971
Observations 85 62 60
Notes: See notes to Appendix Table 1A.
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http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art20Figure 1: Returns by group, 1963-1966
Figure 2: Returns by group, 1963-1966
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Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressFigure 3: Abnormal excess returns of fully a⁄ected group
Figure 4: Abnormal excess returns of partially a⁄ected group
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http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art20Figure 5: Abnormal returns near SEC registration
Figure 6: Abnormal returns near expected SEC registration date for late ￿lers
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Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressFigure 7: Bid/ask spreads around date of initial SEC registration
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